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Executive Summary 
 
1.0 This paper summarises the interim findings of a review of 
secondary data on approaches to the balance of funding in a 
range of western democracies.  Its primary purpose is to 
identify specific countries that may offer lessons for the 
current review of the balance of funding in England or which 
the ODPM may wish us to study in more detail as part of its 
wider study of international approaches to local and regional 
governance.   
Introduction 
2.0 Our analysis of the literature to date suggests that in order to 
analyse approaches to the balance of funding it is important to 
clarify a number of key issues. 
Own resources 
and transfers 
 
Key issues 
3.0 First, there is an important distinction to be made between two 
principal sources of local revenue: (i) ‘own resources’ 
generated by local authorities themselves and (ii) ‘transfers’ 
paid to sub-national government by central government. There 
are a variety of ‘own resources’ including: local taxes 
(property, income, business, sales, consumption, 
environmental, property conveyance), fees, loans, and rent 
from property.  ‘Transfers’ usually take the form of grants but 
some forms of shared taxation may also be transfers. The key 
issue in terms of the balance of funding is the extent to which 
local authorities participate in the determination of such taxes 
and can influence both their base and rate. In the vast majority 
of cases, local authorities have little control over these.  There 
are, though, regimes with relatively high levels of ‘own’ 
resources and low levels of transfers (e.g. Germany, 
Switzerland, the Nordic countries and France) as well as 
others with low local resources and high degree of transfers 
(e.g. Austria, the Netherlands and the UK).   
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Political 
decentralisation 
vs. fiscal 
decentralisation 
4.0 Second, it is important to consider levels of (i) political 
decentralisation and (ii) fiscal decentralisation since it is the 
combination of the two that determines the level of discretion 
that local authorities actually have over fund raising and 
expenditure. Our review suggests that whilst there are a 
number of countries in which there has been quite extensive 
political/administrative decentralisation in the last ten to 
fifteen years this has not always been accompanied by fiscal 
decentralisation. 
Ring fencing 
5.0 Third, it is important to take account of the extent to which 
resources may be (i) ‘earmarked’ for specific purposes or (ii) 
‘non-earmarked’ or general. Both ‘own resources’ and 
‘transfers’ may be ring fenced.  A key determinant of the level 
of local fiscal autonomy is therefore which tier of government 
determines the uses to which funding can be put.  Thus ‘own 
resources’ that are ring fenced for specific purposes by a 
central government may allow less local control than transfers 
that are not ring fenced. 
Central-local 
relations 
6.0 Underlying these distinctions are two contrasting models of 
central-local relationships: (i) a principal/agent model and (ii) 
a ‘choice’ model.  The ‘principal agent’ approach envisages 
local government primarily as an agent of delivery of priorities 
and objectives that are determined by ‘higher’ tiers of 
government – the region, Land, province or national 
government – and relies on bureaucratic/legal controls. A 
‘choice’ model emphasises the needs and preferences of local 
people – service users, citizens, local business etc. –and 
depends on mechanisms by which local stakeholders express 
their priorities – for example through voting or public 
engagement and stakeholder engagement/consultation.  In 
many countries the principal-agent model came to underpin 
central-local relations in the post-war welfare state era when 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
4
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
local authorities were used to implement welfare policies 
(such as the provision of public sector housing, state education 
and health services).  In recent years there has been growing 
recognition of the limitations of this model and some interest 
in new forms of central-local relations. 
7.0 Our research has drawn on data from the Council of Europe, 
OECD, and IMF sources as well as the academic literature.  It 
suggests that whilst there are a wide variety of arrangements 
with regard to the balance of funding in different countries, 
there are also a number of general trends which merit further 
analysis. 
International 
trends 
8.0 Overall, there appears to be a general tendency towards 
increasing use of ‘transfers’ and decreasing reliance on ‘own 
resources’.  Accompanying this trend, and apparently 
contradicting it, is a general move in favour of ‘block’ rather 
than ‘ring fenced grants’. 
Transfers vs. 
own resources 
 
Block and ring 
fenced grants 
9.0 The result has been that, in general terms, the level of local 
fiscal control has increased in recent years and the ‘choice 
model’ seems to have become more important though most 
states continue to embody elements of the ‘principal agent’ 
approach. The explanation of the apparent contradiction noted 
in 8.0 may be that the choice model is served by the element 
of fiscal control over transferred resources rather than by own 
resources 
Local fiscal 
autonomy 
Levels of local 
authority 
expenditure 
10.0 At the same time, from the point of view of strengthening 
local democracy, there are concerns about the decline in the 
level of ‘own resources’ and in most EU countries there have 
been attempts to keep down the overall level of local authority 
spending in order to meet the convergence criteria laid down 
in the Maastricht Treaty. Local property 
taxes © School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
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11.0 The property tax, the quintessential local tax, has apparently 
been a small and decreasing part of local revenue in several 
countries (including Denmark, Luxembourg, Austria and the 
UK).  Although there are some states where it has increased 
(Spain, Italy and Portugal).  (The imposta comunali sugli 
immobili, a recently introduced and apparently successful 
local property tax, may be worth examining in greater detail at 
a later stage in this research). 
12.0 Most states have diversified systems of taxation with taxes on 
business activity being popular. They are popular with central 
governments because of their high yield and buoyancy.  
However, this form of taxation has come under increasing 
pressure as localities have competed to attract and retain 
businesses. 
Business taxes 
Local 
spending as % 
of GDP 
13.0 Analysis of the elements of the balance of funding in the UK 
compared to other countries is complicated. Political and legal 
contexts vary between states, the available data are often 
several years out of date and local government finance 
systems in other countries are do not of course stand still.  
However, according to an analysis by the OECD, local 
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP appears to be 
comparatively low in the UK (see graph in Annex 2, Technical 
Annexes).  Analysis by the Council of Europe of the 
proportion of expenditures in terms of “the origin of resources 
in local budgets” in 1994/1995 suggests that the UK 
corresponded quite closely to the average for the member 
states of the Council of Europe in terms of own resources, 
transfers, fees and charges, raised capital and “other” sources. 
The figures for the UK and Council of Europe member states 
(average in brackets) were as follows: ‘local taxes’ = 25% 
(25.73%); ‘fees and charges’ = 11% (12.24%); ‘transfers’ = 
53% (49.03%); ‘capital raising’ = 8% (5.55%); ‘other’ = 4% 
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(6.88%). Local expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the UK 
is 11% (8.91%) and as a percentage of General Government 
Expenditure it is 27% (22.12%).  The average for Council of 
Europe member states excluding the transition countries in 
east and central Europe for local taxes is 33% (UK, 25.73%) 
and for transfers 40% (UK, 53%).  
14.0 The proportion of local taxes appears to be higher than in the 
UK in a number of countries including Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden and Switzerland (where it is above 45%) and 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Finland, Germany and Italy 
(where it is between 30 and 45%).  Countries such as Spain, 
Portugal and Greece have comparable rates to the UK.  
Austria and the Netherlands have lower proportions than the 
UK. These data suggests therefore that the UK is towards the 
lower/middle end of the spectrum. 
Proportion of 
local taxes 
Further 
analysis of 
specific 
lessons from 
other 
countries 
15.0 The broad trends outlined above are useful contextual 
material.  But what is really needed is more in-depth analysis 
of the operation of specific funding mechanisms in specific 
countries to determine whether they offer useful lessons for 
the UK. Depending on the issues that are of most interest, we 
believe the following countries (which share a number of 
similarities with the UK in terms of their levels of socio-
economic development and strength of their democratic 
systems) might provide lessons for local government reform in 
England: 
- Local income tax: Sweden, Denmark and Belgium - the 
European Charter recommends that states do not adopt a 
single form of local taxation, which is precisely what most of  
the Nordic countries have done. Nevertheless, the long 
experience of these countries of this type of local revenue 
deserves further analysis. Furthermore, in recent years, the 
Scandinavian countries have been carrying out important 
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reforms of the Welfare State in which local authorities have 
played a key role. The system has therefore been far from 
static. It would be useful to examine some of these reforms 
and their consequences for local authorities, particularly with 
regard to issues such as equalisation, gearing, and citizen 
participation. Belgium is included in this group precisely 
because it combines a number of types of local taxation, 
although its rather complicated political and institutional 
structures are somewhat removed from those of the UK, even 
after devolution. 
- New forms of property tax: the general tendency has been to 
reduce reliance on property tax even though it is regarded as 
the quintessential local tax. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that it 
will be completely abolished in the UK (or in any of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries where it has a strong tradition at the 
local level). It might be useful therefore to look at a number of 
instances where it has recently been introduced and where it 
seems to be successful, for example Italy and Spain. The 
interest in studying these two states is also that they are 
regionalised unitary states with asymmetrical forms of 
devolution quite similar to the UK’s.  
- Fiscal equalisation (high levels of transfers) and strong 
citizen interest/participation. This is a key aspect of the 
balance of funding issue. It is sometimes argued that a high 
level of fiscal equalisation involving usually earmarked 
transfers from central government will lead to both 
irresponsible spending patterns by local authorities and a 
weakening of citizen participation at the local level given the 
subsequent reduction in local fiscal autonomy. Three countries 
stand out which seem to have both strong equalisation 
schemes and strong citizen participation at the local level. The 
Netherlands has a central transfer percentage even higher than 
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the UK, is strongly committed to equalisation but also seems 
to have strong citizen interest and participation (albeit 
declining somewhat in recent years). Germany has a more 
balanced system of funding but does have a strong system of 
horizontal fiscal equalisation combined with strong citizen 
interest. Canada is another federal state with an Anglo-Saxon 
political tradition, thus its local governments rely on the 
property tax and also a commitment to financial sharing. 
- Combinations of local revenue. It may be interesting to look 
at a number of cases where there is a combination of local 
revenues. Examples include France, Belgium and Spain.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is been to report on the first stages of an analysis of the 
academic and policy literature relating to international approaches to local 
government finance.  This has drawn primarily on the academic literature on local 
government finance in other countries and secondary data from the IMF, OECD, 
World Bank and Council of Europe.  Its aim is to: 
Identify broad trends and issues in terms of approaches to the balance of funding 
in other western democracies; and 
• 
• Suggest some approaches and countries that may repay more in-depth analysis in 
order to examine potentially useful lessons for the English context. 
 
Following completion of this current phase of the work we hope to focus on how 
specific arrangements operate in detail in other countries and the likely impacts, 
potential advantages, risks, constraints and trade-offs associated with their 
introduction in the English context. The aim is to provide information that helps to 
inform the work of the Review Group, and wider policy debate, in a pragmatic way by 
analysing specific international experience and its applicability to the English context.   
 
International surveys of the balance of funding carried out by organisations such as 
the IMF, the OECD, World Bank and the Council of Europe reveal a great variety of 
systems in place. Even within a group of relatively homogeneous countries such as 
the Scandinavian states, where cross-country policy learning and institutional 
imitation is frequent, there are important differences in balance of funding 
arrangements between states. The so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries (the UK, Ireland, 
the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) while sharing some common features 
(an attachment to the local property tax, for example) also differ considerably, not 
least in that some are federal states (US, Canada and Australia), others are quite 
centralised unitary states (New Zealand and Ireland) and the UK is a regionalised 
unitary state. Not surprisingly therefore, the balance of funding arrangements differ in 
each case.  
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On the other hand, all states in the western developed world and, indeed, further 
afield, are subject to similar pressures.  In particular what has become known as 
globalisation has imposed a new fiscal orthodoxy associated with ‘neo-liberalism’. 
This has involved increasing reliance on market forces in the delivery of public 
services, attempts to reduce public expenditure and an emphasis on efficiency and 
fiscal rectitude. Within the European Union, and in states which plan to accede to it, 
these global tendencies have found expression in the creation of the Single Market, 
Economic and Monetary Union and the creation of the Euro. During the 1980s, the 
new orthodoxy led to a profound reconceptualisation of the Welfare State model, 
which found expression in attempts to cut public spending as well as to reduce levels 
of taxation. These tendencies have affected sub-national governments at all levels as 
they had previously been essential instruments in redistribution and welfare policies in 
most western states. They also affected balance of funding arrangements which had to 
adjust both to rising expectations of citizens for better services and less willingness to 
accept the levels of taxation necessary to fund these services. It is striking that these 
same underlying pressures apply to all western European states, including the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands and, more recently, Germany, as well as countries such as 
the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  
 
The international scene, therefore, reveals a picture of great diversity at the 
institutional and policy levels but also one of considerable convergence in terms of the 
challenges that are confronting contemporary states. Furthermore, there has been a 
certain degree of convergence at the level of the policy and institutional responses to 
these challenges thanks to common membership of bodies such as the European 
Union, the Council of Europe and the OECD, a shared awareness of the problems and 
a process of mutual learning. Indeed, organisations such as the IMF and World Bank 
have consciously promoted particular policy approaches among their members as a 
condition for the granting of loans. This does not mean that contrasting institutional 
arrangements, such as those found in federal and different kinds of unitary state, are 
unimportant. These do affect policy responses to the challenges facing states and 
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impact on the detailed operation of balance of funding arrangements. The same is true 
of what has been called ‘state traditions’ of political and administrative culture and 
intergovernmental relations (Dyson, 1980; Loughlin and Peters, 1997). But it does 
mean that, from the point of view of the UK, interesting lessons may be learned from 
different kinds of state which are confronting broadly similar problems. Furthermore, 
the UK itself is evolving because of devolution into a somewhat hybrid entity that is 
neither a traditional unitary state nor a federal state and which might therefore learn 
useful lessons from approaches in a range of other countries.  
 
One of the great difficulties of comparison is that the same terms, or closely related 
terms, can mean quite different things in different countries and languages. Moreover, 
the same term might be used to describe a phenomenon whose significance is 
different in different settings. For example, a “region” in Finland or Ireland, where it 
means a grouping of counties, is very different from a “region” in Italy or France, 
where it refers to a political entity with a democratically elected regional government. 
In section 2 of this report we therefore seek to clarify some of the basic terminology 
that is relevant to comparing the balance of funding across a number of states in order 
to avoid misunderstandings. Section 3 outlines what we see as general trends in 
balance of funding arrangements in a majority of states and notes some of the most 
important exceptions to these broad trends. In Section 4 we suggest a number of 
emerging issues and lessons that might be drawn from our international survey with 
regard to these issues. Section 5 indicates a number of case studies in relation to 
specific issues that are of special interest in current debate on local government 
finance in the UK: local income tax, the property tax, fiscal equalisation and gearing 
and the relationship between these and citizen interest and participation in local 
government.  
 
It is important to emphasise that we have relied mainly on secondary sources in the 
academic literature  (see bibliography) as well as surveys carried out by international 
organisations such as the IMF, the OECD and the Council of Europe. The academic 
literature has been useful in clarifying some of the main issues and problems in local 
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government finance in other states as well as in proposing some solutions to these 
problems. However, from the point of view of the current review, it is limited by its 
somewhat abstract nature and by the difficulty in transposing potential solutions into 
real-life political and administrative settings in the UK. The data available from the 
international organisations also have their strengths and their limitations. Among their 
strengths are the broad overview they provide and the possibility of identifying some 
of the general trends referred to above. They also provide data over relatively long 
periods of time, which allow us to analyse the dynamic tendencies of local 
government funding. Among their limitations is the fact that the data are often 
presented in a non-analytical way and are little more than snapshots of the situation. 
The data also mostly refer to the mid-1990s although the Council of Europe has tried 
to update its data through its networks of experts. Furthermore, some of the aggregate 
data distinguish between “national” and “sub-national” funding but without further 
disaggregating the latter into different levels – regional, provincial/county, municipal. 
Finally, there is a need not simply to update this data but to harmonise it as there are 
serious inconsistencies across the different surveys, even within the same organisation 
such as the Council of Europe. However, in spite of these limitations this analysis of 
current trends does provide a basis for the identification of issues and ‘case study’ 
countries that might repay more in-depth examination in later stages of the study. 
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2.0  Clarification of Terminology 
 
It is important to distinguish between two major sources of revenue for local 
authorities: (i) “own resources” and (ii) “transfers” or “grants” from central 
government. The “balance of funding” issue depends crucially on the relative 
proportions of each of these two sources. 
 
2.1  “Own resources” 
 
“Own resources” refers to funding that local authorities raise themselves and over 
which they have some discretion in terms of how they are raised and the purposes for 
which they are raised within the bounds of the law or the constitution. That local 
authorities should be able to raise their own resources is an important principle of 
local democracy as defined by the European Charter of Local Self-government, 
whose Article 9 states that the financial resources of local authorities should be 
commensurate with their responsibilities and that they should be raised and controlled 
by the local authorities themselves, albeit within the context of national policies. The 
Charter has been signed and ratified by the UK Government. 
 
The following are the main forms of “own resources”: 
 
2.1.1 Local taxes 
There is no unconditional right to local taxes, which are always formulated in the 
context of national policy, although, as stated above, local authorities have an absolute 
right to their own resources, of which local taxes are an important part.  A tax may be 
allocated to the local authority or created by it. However, for it to be truly local, the 
authority must be able to define its basis and to vary its rate.  
A further distinction may be made between exclusive and shared or non-exclusive 
taxes. Exclusive taxes are closest to the ideal of a truly local tax. However, they are 
relatively rare and usually not those which are most buoyant or produce the greatest 
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yield. The taxes which do have these characteristics (for example taxes on business) 
are usually those which central governments keep for themselves.  
Most countries have systems of shared taxation which are common to both central and 
local authorities or, in federal states, shared in different combinations across the 
federal, regional and local levels of government. Taxes that are shared across levels of 
government may be primarily under the control of the central government or they may 
be primarily under the control of the local level (as is the case in the Nordic countries) 
(see table at Annex 8, Technical Annexes)). In Germany, the distribution of taxes is 
regulated by the Constitution and is primarily under the control of the Länder.  Where 
shared taxes are under the control of national or regional government, the impact on 
local autonomy is more akin to transfers to local authorities. Only where they are 
primarily under the control of local governments can they be regarded as genuinely 
local taxes (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 37).  
We thus have three basic categories of local taxation: 
(i) Exclusive local taxes. 
(ii) Common taxes that are non-exclusive but local. 
(iii) Common taxes that are non-exclusive but more akin to transfers. 
 
 
2.1.2 Fees and Charges 
 
There are some local authority services for which users pay a price which covers part 
or all of the cost of the service provided.  A distinction may be made between “real 
charges” and “quasi-charges” (Council of Europe, CDLR p. 31). With real charges, 
what individuals pay is closely related to their usage of the charged service (e.g. water 
charges based on meter readings; charges for refuse collection based on volume or 
weight of refuse). Quasi-charges are when the amount of money individuals pay is 
based on formulae rather than their actual usage of the services (e.g. charges for water 
based on property values; charges for refuse collection based on the size of homes or 
the number of residents). 
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2.1.3 Revenue from local authority 
property 
 
Authorities may generate revenue from their own property holdings.  Approaches to 
efficient asset management are, for example, attracting increasing attention in UK 
local government. 
 
2.1.4 Loans 
 
Loans may be obtained from the financial markets or they may come in the form of 
transfers from central government. They arise when it is necessary for a local 
authority to balance its budget which is usually in advance and which may therefore 
be vulnerable to shortfalls in expenditure due to unforeseen natural or economic 
circumstances. There are a variety of rules governing the possibility of local 
authorities obtaining loans in the different member states. In no state is there an 
unrestricted right to borrow and the conditions are usually laid down either by the 
constitution, statute or the central government. In some cases, as in some of the 
Nordic countries, central government will guarantee to underwrite a local authority’s 
budget if this proves inadequate but this transfer is regarded as a loan which must be 
repaid with interest by the local authority over a specified period of time (usually two 
years).  
 
2.2  Transfers 
 
The term transfers covers all movements of budgetary resources from the central state 
to local authorities. These are intended to meet the aim of the European Charter’s 
Article 9, para. 2 mentioned above, which stipulates that local authorities’ resources 
must be commensurate with their responsibilities and recognises that own resources 
alone and, in particular, local taxes are insufficient to do this.  
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2.2.1 Grants 
 
 Grants constitute the main form of budgetary transfers in most countries (see table at 
Annex 5, Technical Annexes). In general they have been used by central (and/or 
regional) governments as a way of ensuring that local authorities carry out certain 
tasks according to the specifications laid down by central authorities (for example 
ensuring that local authorities provide specific services and/or meet nationally set 
minimum service standards) (see table at Annex 6, Technical Annexes). They have 
also been used as a means of financial equalisation (by transferring funds from 
relatively prosperous localities to areas with higher needs and/or smaller fiscal bases). 
 
2.2.2 Block grants vs. Specific grants 
 
The significance of this distinction between block and specific grants is that block 
grants give a local authority a high discretion in the use of the money transferred, 
while, specific grants are ear-marked for specific purposes which are usually 
determined by a higher tier of government. In the latter case, the local authority is in 
effect in a principal/agent relationship with the central government that is allocating 
funding and, thus, usually has a lower level of autonomy. Article 9 of the European 
Charter recommends that block or general grants be used as a way of ensuring local 
autonomy. 
 
2.2.3 Shared taxes 
 
As noted above, shared taxes can sometimes be regarded as transfers rather than 
genuine local taxes since local governments may not have discretion over how the 
funding is used. The best known examples are Germany and Austria both of which 
have several shared taxes. Some shared taxes give the local authority a degree of 
discretion over their base and rate but in the vast majority of cases this is determined 
by a formula detailed in the constitution or by a higher authority. Thus, these shared 
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taxes should be regarded as transfers from above which, in practice, limit local 
autonomy (Council of Europe, CDLR, pp. 40-41).  
 
 
3.0 General International 
Trends 
 
In this section we summarise the evidence of general trends in the balance of funding 
that may be relevant to the English context. 
 
3.1 Decentralisation 
A key question for this review of trends outside of the UK is whether there is a 
general tendency towards decentralisation or, on the contrary, towards, centralisation 
in the balance of funding. In order to address this issue properly we first need to 
distinguish between at least three aspects of decentralisation: 
 
(i) Political decentralisation namely the transfer of formal political power 
from “higher” (often national) levels of government to “lower” level 
governments (usually local and/or regional). There has been a general 
trend across western Europe towards political decentralisation since the 
1970s and such decentralisation has been recognised as a general principle 
of good governance by bodies such as the Council of Europe, the European 
Union, the IMF, and, more recently, the United Nations.  The UK, resisted 
this general trend throughout the 1980s and early 1990s but has begun to 
embrace it since the election of the Labour Government in 1997 with its 
commitment to the new Scottish Parliament, the Welsh, Northern Ireland 
and London assemblies and elected regional government in English 
regions that vote for it. Centralisation or decentralisation might also occur 
at the regional level in the sense that a regional government may 
accumulate political power and functions at the expense of lower levels 
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such as provinces and municipalities. This is the case, for example, in 
Belgium where the regions have taken over some of the functions of the 
lower levels. A similar process has occurred in Catalonia. 
 
(ii) Fiscal decentralisation concerns the transfer of financial resources to 
lower levels of government according to the principles enunciated above. 
This can, in theory at least, be achieved without the establishing of new 
structures associated with political decentralisation.  Equally it may be 
that, in many cases, political decentralisation, involving the devolution of 
responsibilities to new assemblies or indeed to local authorities, may occur 
without the appropriate transfer of financial resources. The general trends 
in fiscal decentralisation across Europe and other western democracies are 
less clear-cut than are recent developments with regard to formal political 
decentralisation. 
 
(iii) Political decentralisation without fiscal decentralisation, otherwise 
known as Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, is in reality a form of continuing 
centralised control. As Caulfield (2000, p.1) notes “In OECD countries 
there has been a growing mismatch between the functional competencies 
and fiscal responsibility of local government”.  
 
3.2 Decentralised control over 
funding 
 
There are two opposing arguments found in the academic literature with regard to the 
decentralisation of control over local funding. The first was made in the 1950s in a 
situation of (national) welfare economics. It contends that “only central governments 
could achieve local economic efficiency through policies of fiscal equalisation and 
redistribution” (Caulfield, 2000 quoting Tiebout, 1956 and Musgrave, 1973). The 
counter-argument stresses that local fiscal autonomy is necessary as a way of 
increasing the accountability and responsiveness of sub-national governments. These 
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two approaches reflect a difference between “choice” or “agency” models of local-
central government relations. In the choice model, local authorities are seen as being 
best placed to make decisions that reflect the needs and preferences of their local 
communities. In the agency model, local authorities are seen first and foremost as 
agents carrying out policies on behalf of the principal, which is central government.  
 
The principal/agent model was dominant during the period of the hegemony of the 
Welfare State (1945-1975). During this period, as the tasks of government in general 
expanded, sub-national authorities were increasingly used as agents for the 
implementation of central government’s redistributive, equalisation and welfare 
policies. As the tasks of local governments expanded, intergovernmental transfers 
were increasingly used as a means of funding their functions. There were a variety of 
mechanisms used for providing this funding ranging from direct grants to tax sharing 
between central and sub-national governments. In general, grants were earmarked  for 
specific purposes. This tended to diminish the degree of local autonomy. 
 
The choice model may be seen as closer to the neo-liberal approach which 
predominated in the 1980s and 1990s. This approach is, in effect, a response to the 
crisis of the welfare state model of governance and the financial austerity which was 
promoted at national levels as part of what has become the new orthodoxy (sometimes 
known as the “New Public Management”). In the European Union, this was 
reinforced by the drive towards the creation of a common currency and the criteria of 
financial rectitude laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. Often, it was local authorities 
which had to bear the brunt of these developments and, in any case, there was a 
general tendency to reduce direct grants as welfare policies were cut back. In some 
countries this was accompanied by increasing local autonomy over funding, but where 
funding was less available local authorities were often left to take the responsibility 
for citizens’ discontent.  To some extent, then, the decentralisation movement of the 
1980s and 1990s was the “decentralisation of penury”, often under the guise of 
enhancing local democracy. In other countries (including the UK), however, the 
imperative of controlling public spending led central governments to tighten their grip 
on spending at local level.  There are, nevertheless, models that can be seen as 
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reflecting an approach that is rooted in the concept of local democracy and is not 
necessarily “neo-liberal” since, during this period, there has been a general trend in 
many countries (though not the UK) away from specific-purpose grants and towards 
block grants (see tables at Annex 6 and 7, Technical Annexes). Most countries 
currently combine the “agency” and “choice” models, though most tend to emphasise 
one or the other as a dominant tendency (Caulfied, 2000). 
 
3.3      Budgets in relation to Gross     
Domestic Product & General 
Government Expenditure  
 
Although there are severe methodological problems in comparing general trends 
across countries, we can identify some indicators with regard to the degree of fiscal 
centralisation/decentralisation.  In doing so it is important to bear in mind that simply 
stating aggregate figures may not necessarily give a true reading of the degree of 
centralisation or decentralisation. This will also be a function of other factors such as 
the constitutional rules governing intergovernmental relations, which differ in federal 
states and unitary states, the degree of local autonomy and discretion in the 
determination of local budgets, institutional factors such as the nature and size of the 
local authorities and in political factors such as whether there are coalition or single 
party local governments. Nevertheless, the aggregate trends are useful starting points 
and provide an overall context for more detailed analyses of particular cases. 
 
3.3.1 The scale of the local budget 
in the context of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) & 
General Government 
Expenditure (GGE) 
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As a general rule, and bearing in mind the caveat highlighted above, the higher the 
local budget in relation to both GDP and GGE, the greater the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation. Putting the UK in the context of the Council of Europe states, we can 
see that it is above average  - 11% of GDP as compared to an average of 8.91% and 
27% against an average of 22.12% of GGE (see table at  Annex 1, Technical 
Annexes). 
 
In this regard, the UK finds itself in a middle group of countries (France, Switzerland, 
Germany and Finland) whose percentages of GGE range between 27-30%. As might 
be expected, Norway (18.9% of GDP and 60% of GGE) and Sweden (27.5% of GDP 
and 38% of GGE) stand out as leaders in this respect and to these should be added the 
other two Scandinavian countries Denmark (19.9% of GDP and 31.28% of GGE) and 
Finland (18% of GDP and 29.5% of GGE). The lower levels of GGE percentage in 
these two countries is accounted for by the fact that social security payments are not 
included in these figures but there are similar levels of GDP percentage.  
 
IMF data provides some evidence of trends between 1985 and 1994. and suggests 
three main trends: 
 
(i)  stability at a high level in local authorities’ share of overall public authority 
budgets: Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany.  
 
(ii) increasing local budgets: several countries who have been “catching up” with 
regard to decentralisation: Spain, Italy, Portugal, France. 
 
(iii) decreasing local budgets: mostly involving countries of East and Central 
Europe (but these need to be treated with caution as the date 1994 was too soon after 
the transition for post-transition reforms to be taken into account) but also some old-
established western democracies: including UK, Sweden, Switzerland. 
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3.3.2  The reduction of local 
authorities’ own resources, 
increasing shared taxes and 
transfers  
 
According to the Council of Europe data, (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 7, p. 40). in all 
its member states, transfers now account, on average, for 49.03% of all local 
government funding, while local taxes are only 25.73%, with the remainder accounted 
for by “fees and charges” at 12.24%,  “capital raising at 5.55% and “other” at 6.88% 
(although the high level of transfers is partly accounted for by the presence of the 
countries of east and central Europe). The UK is situated quite close to these averages 
with transfers at 53%, local taxes at 25%, fees and charges at 11%, capital raising at 
8% and “other” at 4%.  
However, a distinction needs to be made between the older democracies of western 
Europe and the transition countries of east and central Europe (Council of Europe, 
2000, p. 41) and it is more useful to compare the UK figures with the averages of the 
first group. Among the older democracies, the average for local taxes is 33% and for 
transfers 40%, while among the latter the figures are 18% and 66%. The older 
democracies can be further divided into four distinct categories: 
 
(i) countries where local taxes are more than 45% (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, 
and Switzerland at 46%); 
 
(ii) countries where they are between  30% and 42% (Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Finland, Germany and Italy); 
 
(iii) countries where they are between 20% and 30% (Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
the UK); 
 
(iv) countries where they are less than 20% (Austria, Netherlands). 
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Two important observations can be made about these figures.  
First, there is no correlation between the balance of funding and the state form – 
federal or unitary and, among the latter, centralised, decentralised or regionalised 
unitary. Federal states (Belgium, Germany and Switzerland) are found in categories 
(i), (ii) and (iv); centralised unitary states (Greece, Portugal) in (iii) and (iv); 
decentralised unitary states (the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) in (i), 
(ii) and (iv); and regionalised unitary states (France, Spain, Italy and the UK) in (ii), 
(iii) and (iv).  
Second, in the majority of the older democracies local taxation is above 20%. The 
surprising exception is the Netherlands, where it stands at just 15%. The UK is 
situated within the majority grouping but it is also in a category which includes 
Portugal and Greece, two highly centralised unitary states. It could be argued that, 
given its size and moves towards decentralisation, one might expect the UK to more 
‘naturally’ fit into group (ii) alongside France and Italy.  
(See table at  Annex 4, Technical Annexes) 
 
3.3.3 Local autonomy 
Given the foregoing analysis does it make it sense to categorise states along a 
spectrum of federal to centralised unitary? The answer to this question is found in the 
degree of discretion of the local authorities. Most transfers take the form of grants 
which local authorities may freely dispose of (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 15). (See 
tables at Annex 5, 6 and 7, Technical Annexes). Furthermore, it is important to take 
account of the share of funding between the national and local levels and intermediate 
levels such as the Länder and the Regions and provinces.  
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3.3.4 The primary local tax: property 
tax 
 
Historically, the primary form of local taxation has been the property tax, which is a 
tax on assets and not on income or consumption. In the 25 countries analysed by the 
Council of Europe (2000), this form of taxation was found in 23, the exceptions being 
Malta and Sweden. However, the basis of the tax varies considerably across Europe. 
It can be simply a tax on land, i.e. unbuilt property (YRM, Greece, Lithuania, Russia); 
or only on buildings (Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway). 
The two taxes can both be applied but remain distinct (Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Latvia, Portugal). It can be applied to both buildings and land 
(Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom).  Tax payers are usually 
landowners but in some cases (Netherlands, UK) they may be tenants. 
There are also many different ways of calculating the tax: some countries use the 
“rateable value” or “rateable income” of the asset. Others (Iceland, UK, Sweden) use 
its “market value” or its “estimated value” (Lithuania). The valuation is usually 
carried out by specialised commissions in collaboration with the tax department of the 
local authority (Ireland) or of the central state (Belgium, France). Germany combines 
these methods.  
There is also a wide variation in the property tax as a proportion of local tax revenue 
ranging from 100% in Anglo-Saxon countries (UK, Ireland but also the US, Canada 
and Australia) to very small proportions (17% in Belgium, 14% in Spain and Italy, 
12% in Latvia, 11% in Iceland, 10% in France, 8.8% in Portugal and 7.6% in the 
Netherlands).  
According to OECD figures, the proportion of property tax has been in decline in 
several countries: Denmark, Luxembourg, Austria and the UK, although in a few 
others it has been increasing: Spain, Italy and Portugal. However, these trends should 
be placed in the broader context where local taxes are already a very small proportion 
of total local revenue in most countries and, according to the same OECD figures, 
have been steadily decreasing since 1975 (from 12.5% to 11.8% of GDP). 
Recent analyses have suggested that the scope for genuine local taxes, i.e. taxes for 
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which local councils can at least determine the rate (such as property taxes), is 
narrowing (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 15 and p. 43) (See table at  Annex 8, 
Technical Annexes). 
Among the reasons for the decline of this form of local taxation are:  
the difficulty of evaluating its bases and of determining the true market value of 
property; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
its lack of buoyancy and its inflexibility; 
its unpredictability given the large fluctuations in property values; 
its “blindness” – i.e. it gives little consideration to the social situation of tax-
payers (Caulfield, 2000, p. 7); 
it is subject to central government controls through rate capping; and 
the difficulties arising with the introduction of value added tax.  
 
The previous UK government ran into political difficulties when it substituted the 
Community Charge (“poll tax”) and had to revert to a form of property tax (the 
council tax). On the other hand, Italy provides an example of the successful 
introduction of a council tax on property (ICI). It is also true that other taxes may be 
associated with the property tax, as in France, where the tax on the removal of 
household rubbish is levied on the same basis of assessment (Council of Europe, 
2000, p. 46).  
 
3.3.5 Supplementary taxes: income 
tax, the business tax, and 
others 
 
These are the two principal local taxes which supplement the property tax. They 
represent the largest portion of taxes controlled by local authorities in Europe and, in 
some states, the majority of their resources. In Sweden, income tax accounts for 58% 
of all local revenue and, in France, trade tax accounts for around 50% of the local 
authorities own tax revenue (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 47).  
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(i) Local Income Tax 
• Income tax levied and collected by local authorities is found mainly in the Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden) but also in Belgium and 
Switzerland. 
International experience suggests that a local income tax offers two main 
advantages: 
- its simplicity both in the basis of assessment and its rate of assessment. 
However, there is a difference in the way the tax is calculated. The local rate is 
applied on a proportional basis, that of the state on a graduated basis reflecting 
two different philosophies: redistribution on the part of the state and the common 
good on the part of local authorities; 
- it is more equitable than the alternatives and can be adjusted for inflation both 
continually and uniformly. It can therefore help to reduce disparities in taxation 
over the national territory.  
 
There are also disadvantages: 
- its base is limited by options decided at a higher level; 
- it is not very transparent – local tax policy and national tax policy are difficult to 
separate; 
- the “joint” nature of the tax means that the central government must become 
involved in setting the base and the rate of the tax, thus lessening the autonomy of 
the local authority (see table at Annex 9, Technical Annexes). 
 
The European Charter of Local Self-government recommends that there be a 
diversified system of local resources. Reliance on a single source of income, 
whether income tax or property tax goes against this principle. 
 
(ii) Business Tax 
• Local taxes on business activity are numerous and varied. The main form is a 
company tax and this is found in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Spain (see table at Annex 9, Technical Annexes).  
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
27
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
One problem with this form of taxation is that there is no homogeneous basis for 
its assessment. The primary item may be: profits (Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal); capital assets (France); the number of persons employed (Belgium, 
Spain), motor power (Belgium). This may stand alone or jointly with other items: 
capital assets (Germany); wages and salaries (France); surface area (Spain and 
Italy), electrical power (Spain), or activity sector (Spain and Italy). The 
independent professions  may or may not be included (doctors, lawyers, notaries 
public, etc.). 
Another problem is that the central state is also in competition with local 
authorities for these taxes because of their high yield and buoyancy.  
 
• Some other taxes can be found in other states: 
- “pocket-money” tax: on dog licences, entertainment, etc. 
- consumption/sales tax (now overtaken by VAT). 
- environmental taxes (a growing area). 
- vehicle taxes: has become more widespread as several states have decentralised 
and the vehicle tax has been used as a way of financing this decentralisation: Italy, 
France, Portugal, Spain. 
- property conveyance tax: found in Southern Europe: Spain, Portugal, France as 
well as Slovenia and YRM. 
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4.0     Emerging issues and lessons  
4.1    Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to report on our analysis of the academic and policy 
literature relating to international approaches to local government finance.  This 
suggests that: 
There is a wide diversity of approaches to the balance of funding issue in other 
western democracies. 
• 
• Some other countries appear to offer examples and experiences that may be 
relevant to current policy developments in England and in particular to work of 
the Review Group examining the Balance of Funding.  
 
However, as noted above, whilst analysis of academic literature and secondary 
sources is useful in providing an overview of broad trends in relation to the balance of 
funding in different countries, a proper assessment of the usefulness or otherwise to 
English policy makers of approaches in other countries requires a more detailed, 
firsthand examination of how particular systems operate in specific countries.   
In this section we outline some of the issues that we believe may be particularly 
relevant and we would welcome further discussion with the Review Group and others 
about which, if any, of these we might usefully examine in more detail in order to 
assist the on-going policy debate on the balance of funding issue 
 
4.2   Issues for further analysis 
It would be premature at this stage to finalise the issues for more detailed 
examination.  However, on the basis of our analysis of the literature to date, we 
believe that there are a number of issues relating to international experiences and 
approaches that are likely to be informative.   
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4.2.1 Recent trends in the balance of 
funding  
Our analysis to date suggests a number of interim findings: 
It seems clear that the balance of funding has been changing in recent years in 
many other western democracies. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The overall trend appears to be towards increased reliance on transfers from 
central to sub-national governments (see table at Annex 4, Technical Annexes).  
Prima facie this represents increased central control over the total amount of 
expenditure by sub-national governments, a development which is consistent with 
the imperative of controlling total public spending. 
Paradoxically though there also appears to have been a general shift away from 
the hypothecation of funding that is transferred to sub-national governments, a 
development that is likely to increase local discretion over how the available 
funding is spent. 
The forms in which funding is distributed by central to sub-national governments 
vary considerably between different countries (see tables at  Annex 4 and 5, 
Technical Annexes). 
The constitutional and political settings in which changes in the balance of 
funding have taken place also vary considerably, as do the functions, structures 
and powers of sub-national governments in different countries. 
These findings suggest that there is no one ideal approach to the balance of 
funding issue that can be transplanted wholesale to England.  There are, though, a 
number of experiences that appear to be worth examining in more detail to shed 
light on the potential (positive and negative) impacts of changes in the balance of 
funding in England and the level of risk associated with change. 
Key questions that might be addressed in more detail through examination of the 
detailed operation of the balance of funding in other countries include: 
What have been the drivers of recent changes in the balance of funding in other 
countries and how do these compare with policy imperatives in England? 
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What have been the (positive and negative) impacts of changes in the balance of 
funding in other countries? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
How might ring fencing be reduced in England without jeopardising central 
government priorities? 
What wider policies (for example changes to the powers and duties of local 
government) would need to accompany changes in the balance of funding in order 
to achieve desired outcomes? 
What, if any, have been the risks of changes in the balance of funding in other 
countries?   
What evidence is there about how these risks might be best alleviated in the 
English context? 
 
4.2.2 Processes of reform 
Our analysis to date suggests that there have been some significant shifts in the 
balance of funding and that changes in the balance of funding have been implemented 
in a variety of different ways in other countries. 
This in turn suggests that we might usefully examine the following questions: 
What mechanisms/reforms have been used in other countries to change the 
balance of funding? 
Which approaches to implementing reform appear to have been most successful? 
To what extent might these be usefully replicated in England? 
How might changes in the balance of funding reinforce the wider objectives of 
government policy including the local government modernisation agenda?  We 
might, for example, examine what evidence there is that changes in the balance of 
funding could increase local democratic participation and whether a different 
balance of funding would enhance (or constrain) new powers that authorities have 
been granted including new flexibilities and freedoms and the power to promote 
well-being. 
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4.2.3 Handling pressures on resources 
Our analysis of the literature suggests that most national and local governments are 
under pressure to control public spending.  We might therefore usefully explore how 
other countries are dealing with pressures on local resource bases including 
approaches to: 
Maintaining appropriate control over public spending; • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Dealing with the high gearing effects associated with small local tax bases; 
Coping with rising public expectations; and  
Funding public sector pay increases. 
 
Criteria used to determine the appropriate balance of funding 
Stoker and Meehan (2003) suggest five ‘design principles for a system of local 
government finance’ that the balance of funding review might take account of - 
accountability, equity, fairness, buoyancy and a ‘holistic approach’ that encourages 
‘joined-up’ working between agencies.   
Our analysis suggests that: 
The criteria used by other countries to determine the appropriate balance of central 
and local funding vary considerably as do underlying assumptions about the role 
of local governments. 
We might therefore usefully explore in more detail: 
The criteria used to determine the balance of funding and assumptions about the 
respective roles of central and sub-national government in other countries. 
The extent to which and ways in which the design criteria suggested by Stoker and 
Meehan are reflected in the local government finance systems of countries. 
The extent to which criteria used elsewhere might be useful in informing current 
policy discussions in England and, in particular, the work of the Review Group. 
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4.2.4 New policy instruments 
Our work to date suggests that: 
There are very different combinations of finance arrangements in different 
countries (see tables at Annex 4 and 5, Technical Annexes).     
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
It might therefore be useful to examine in more detail: 
How have finance reforms been combined with other policies (e.g. political 
reforms, structural changes, local government re-organisation etc.)? 
What combinations of finance and other reforms appear to have been most 
effective?  
In particular we believe that it could be useful to the Review Group if we gather and 
synthesise more detailed evidence about the workings of a range of finance 
instruments including:  
 
Local taxes: 
What are the main kinds of local taxes in use in other western democracies? 
How do different kinds of local taxes operate in practice? 
What have been the impacts of the introduction of new local taxes in other 
countries (including political impacts, fiscal impacts, equity issues etc.) 
What combinations of local taxes appear to work best in other countries? 
What does international experience suggest might be the advantages, 
disadvantages and risks associated with the introduction of local taxes in England? 
What does international experience suggest about the relative merits and the risks 
associated with the introduction of: 
 local income taxes 
 local sales taxes 
 local tourism taxes? 
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What practical problems and constraints have been encountered elsewhere 
with each of these kinds of local taxes and how, if at all, might they be 
alleviated in England? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Business rates: 
What are the main kinds of business rates used in other western democracies? 
How do these operate in practice? 
What does international experience suggest might be the advantages, 
disadvantages and risks associated with the different approaches to business rates 
in England? 
In particular what, if anything, does experience in other countries suggest about 
the likely benefits, disbenefits and risks associated with restoration of local control 
of business rates? 
Charges and fees: 
What are the main kinds of fees and charges that exist in other western 
democracies? 
How do these operate in practice? 
What does international experience suggest might be the advantages, 
disadvantages and risks associated with the different approaches to business rates 
in England? 
What might be the implications for charging on issues of equity and fair access to 
services? 
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5.0 Case Studies to examine key 
emerging issues 
Clearly, which country (or countries) are selected for more detailed analysis needs to 
be determined by the particular issue(s) that are of most interest to the Review Group 
and other policy makers.  In this section we identify some of the countries that we 
believe may be most relevant to some of the main issues that have emerged from our 
analysis to date. 
 
 
5.1  Local Income Tax 
 
Countries that may offer useful lessons in relation to local income taxes include 
Denmark Finland, Norway, Sweden and Belgium. 
In the Scandinavian countries, a local supplementary income tax is by far the main 
source of local revenue although each Scandinavian country has a different 
arrangement. In all the Scandinavian countries, with their strong welfare states, 
equalisation has been an important consideration and this has had to be reconciled 
with a strong tradition of local democracy and participation even though this has been 
in decline in recent years (Lidstrom in Loughlin, 2001). However, this has come 
under criticism and there have been several reforms in recent years. It would be useful 
to examine in greater detail the reasons behind and the scope of these reforms with a 
view to seeing the advantages and disadvantages of this form of tax.  
The Belgian case might be interesting to follow up given that income tax is combined 
with other forms of local taxation, including the property tax, thus avoiding the 
reliance on one predominant single tax criticised by the Council of Europe. In effect, 
although Belgian municipalities are dependent on the region for the transfer of a 
portion of taxes raised and collected by the region, they may also impose a 
supplementary property tax (which may be 10-40 times as high as the base rate) and 
also a supplementary income tax (usually set at 6-8% of personal income). However, 
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the central government may impose restrictions on both the base and the rate of the 
supplementary property tax (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000  p. 27).  
 
 
5.2  New forms of property tax 
 
Italy and Spain appear to be an potentially interesting case studies in relation to 
propery taxes.  
 
As mentioned above, both countries have introduced forms of property tax in recent 
years and, according to Council of Europe (2000) evaluations, in the Italian case, at 
least, these seem to have been quite successful. In Italy, fiscal decentralisation has 
been part of the ongoing constitutional reforms of the Italian state which, at least in 
part, attempted to reduce the excessive levels of central control over the regions and 
municipalities. (see Francesco Merloni, “Du centralisme de l’Etat à la République des 
autonomies territoriales”, in Alain Delcamp and John Loughlin (eds) (2003). Own 
resources in the form of taxes in the ordinary regions went from 2% of local revenue 
in 1991 to 46.9% in 1999. For the municipalities, the figures were 14.4% in 1991 to 
28.3% in 1995. With fees and charges added, self-financing of the communes in 1999 
was 44.5%.  The major new tax was the tax on property - the imposta comunali sugli 
immobili. 
 
 
5.3 Fiscal equalisation and strong 
citizen interest/participation 
 
The Netherlands, Canada, Germany appear to be interesting in relation to the issues of 
fiscal equalisation and citizen participation.   
 
The Netherlands is an interesting case study given that its level of transfers is even 
greater than the UK’s but there is also a high level of participation and interest in local 
politics in that country, although again this is declining but to nowhere near the UK 
level (Hendriks, in Loughlin, 2001). It is also of note because of the ‘Tilburg Model’, 
named after the town which developed more neo-liberal type policies in the 1980s and 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
36
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
has become a reference point to local authorities in both the Netherlands and Germany 
(for the Netherlands, see Frank Hendriks and Pieter Tops, 1999, and, for a riposte to 
this analysis, Hellmut Wollmann, 2000). In Germany, there are a variety of 
arrangements in different Länder and it is interesting to note the arrangements for 
reconciling this diversity with the overall commitment to Finanzausgleichung, which 
has been largely a horizontal equalisation process involving the Länder, who also 
have responsibility for vertical equalisation within their territories as they have 
primary responsibility for local fiscality. In Germany, too, there is currently an 
enquiry going on with regard to the German federal system and whether this ought to 
be reformed. Canada has also tried to combine strong fiscal equalisation with citizen 
participation while Germany is interesting because of its institutional mechanisms of 
Finanzausgleichung.  
 
 
5.4  Combinations of local revenue 
 
France, Belgium and Spain all offer interesting examples of combinations of local 
revenue. 
 
Belgium and the southern European countries are interesting precisely because of the 
attempt to combine several forms of taxation (see table at Annex 10, Technical 
Annexes). There is an abundant literature on the French case and this would be 
interesting to follow up given that country’s decentralisation programme has now 
been in place since the early 1980s (Loughlin and Mazey, 1995). In France, there have 
been four different kinds of property tax (in existence since the Revolution and 
therefore known as the ‘quatre vieilles’, even if they have been updated in recent 
years): on built premises in both rural and urban areas (impôt foncier bâti), on 
residents (taxe d’habitation), and on business premises taxe professionelle). Belgium 
is a fully fledged federal state but may have important lessons with regard to 
regional/provincial/municipal relations. In effect, there has been a fiscal centralisation 
at the regional level at the expense of the provinces and municipalities. The interest of 
the Spanish case lies in the fact that it is a unitary state with strong regional 
institutions. There have been tensions between the national and regional levels about 
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tax distribution but the share of local taxes, including property tax, has been 
increasing over the years and the central and regional government have attempted to 
develop a long-term planning approach (PricewaterhouseCooper, 2002, p. 142). This 
could be of interest to the UK government whose own devolution programme is quite 
similar to that of Spain.. 
 
5.5  Next steps 
We anticipate that we can add most value by focusing in detail on a number of 
specific issues, probably examining their operation in detail in a small number of case 
study countries.  This will enable us to examine in detail how alternative approaches 
operate in practice and the likely impacts and potential risks of replicating such 
arrangements (or variants of them) in England.   
However, given the resources likely to be available to undertake case studies, we 
probably will not have the capacity to address all of these issues or to deal with them 
all in the same level of detail.  We would therefore welcome further discussion with 
the ODPM and/or members of the Review Group in order to determine: 
For which, if any, of these issues further information and analysis would be most 
useful?   
• 
• 
• 
• 
What, if any, other issues they consider important? 
Which approaches elsewhere are likely to be of particular relevance to the work of 
the Review Group and other on-going policy developments and discussions? 
Which countries are most likely to provide useful insights? 
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7.0 Annex – Briefing Note on 
Sweden 
 
 
Major changes in the system of financing 
Swedish local government, during the period of 
1990-2003: a briefing note prepared by Professor 
John Loughlin and Dr Anders Lidstrom for the 
meeting of the research subgroup on 18 
November 2003. 
 
7.1 The background: local government finance in Sweden is heavily bound up 
with the Swedish welfare state system. This system, sometimes referred to 
as the “Swedish Model”, was fully established by the 1960s. Local 
government played an important role in the system and, although there 
were high levels of own resources at the local level, local autonomy was 
highly circumscribed by central controls based on principles of 
uniformity, equity and equalization. Strong interest groups, e.g. the trade 
unions, linked to the Social Democratic Party were important in the 
maintenance of the system. The system ran into serious financial and 
economic difficulties from the mid-1980s and this led to a number of 
reforms and experiments. One was the “free commune” experiment which 
lifted some of the centralised regulations in specificied policy areas, 
especially  education, leaving some local authorities free to pursue their 
own policy approaches in these areas. Another was the reform of the 
taxation system (the reduction of the rate of marginal personal and capital-
income tax) and the deregulation of the financial markets following 
world-wide trends. These reforms were applied before Sweden entered 
into a severe economic crisis in the late 1980s, which severely tested the 
“Swedish Model”. Centre-right governments at this period introduced 
important modifications into the system (including cuts in welfare 
services). Some of these were reversed by subsequent Social Democrat 
governments but many were left in place. Local government reform has 
been part of this ongoing set of reforms.  
 
7.2 The grants system: Before 1990, central government financial support to 
local government was transferred through a mixture of ear-marked and 
general grants. In 1990, ear-marked grants in some areas (such as 
education) were merged into a sector grant, allowing a more discretionary 
use of the resources. Three years later, 1993, all sector grants were 
amalgamated into one, general grant for the municipality. This general 
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tendency towards decentralization has now turned into a re-centralization 
phase. In 2000, a new special grant to education was introduced - the 
Wärnerssonpengarna (Ingegärd Wänersson was at the time the Swedish 
minister of primary and secondary education and the label refers to the 
money (pengar) she provided as a grant ) which provides additional 
support to municipalities which have not reduced the teaching staff in the 
schools.  
 
The background is that the Government, already in 1997, attempted to 
transfer more resources to schools by increasing the general grant. It 
turned out that only a marginal share of  these resources went to the 
schools, but they  were instead used for solving other problems that faced 
the municipalities. It became obvious that the very strong emphasis on 
general grants was difficult to combine with the fact that central 
government was still politically accountable for the status of Swedish 
schools. In a way, it was  recognized that the decentralization reforms 
“went too far”, in particular as the value of equality in education is still 
upheld as a major political  goal. The Association of Local Authorities 
have protested, but in vain. There have been similar developments in 
Norway.  
 
7.3 The level of funding: In the early 1990’s, central government finances 
were heavily in deficit because of a combination of high levels of 
unemployment, low growth rates and an unwillingness by the socialist 
government of  that time to reduce spending on public welfare. The huge 
deficit was mainly handled through considerable reductions in public 
funding of welfare. Grants to local authorities were reduced and local 
government forced to cut back on its services. Better times emerged in the 
latter part of the period, and some of the previous reduced services were 
possible to restore. However, further increases of central government 
grants, which were promised, have not occurred due to new problems in 
the Swedish economy (low growth rates) after 2000.  
 
7.4 The system of local government equalization: One of the most heavily 
discussed topics has been how a system of equalization between local 
authorities should be constructed. A system based on grants from central 
government to the most exposed municipalities (mainly with regard to 
unfavourable population structure) has been replaced by a system in 
which rich municipalities transfer resources to less well-off municipalities. 
In the formula, both need and resources are equalized. The underlying 
idea is that there should be a match between equal conditions and equal 
level of services. If municipalities wants a higher level of service, that 
should be reflected through higher taxes. The formula has been modified 
several times during the period. In particular the county council of 
Stockholm and municipalities in greater Stockholm (especially wealthy 
suburban municipalities) complain loudly! 
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7.5 The local government income tax: Tax levels have been reduced 
marginally. The average municipal and county council proportion of the 
total income tax was 31,16 % in 1990 and 30.52 % in 2002 . In order to 
prevent municipalities to compensate for reduced grants, a temporary lid 
on municipal tax increases was introduced in1991 and kept until 1993. 
There has been no debate about the income tax in itself, i.e. no 
suggestions that it should be abolished, replaced by other systems of 
finance, etc. 
 
In practice, the percentages are based on “taxable income”, which is what 
is left after deductions. There are general deductions which everybody can 
make (but some of them are related to income), but you can also claim to 
have your taxable income reduced if you have specific costs for earning 
your money (most common is probably that you have to commute to 
work). Please also note that the municipalities and the county councils 
make their tax decisions independently of each other (even if informal 
consultation usually occurs). 
 
7.6 The “Principle of financing”. In 1993, the Parliament introduced a new 
principle in central-local government relations: It was decided that if 
central government transferred new functions to local government, it 
would also ensure that local government would receive the necessary 
resources, without having to increase the local tax. On a few occasions, 
this principle has not been complied with, according the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities.  
 
7.7 Municipal budgets in balance: From 2000 a new rule has been introduced, 
forcing municipalities to keep their budget in balance. 
 
 
7.8 The current review: The main issue about local government finance is the 
overarching question about how local government will be able to provide 
good welfare services with an ageing population and with increasing 
demands within certain areas (health care, mainly). During this year, a 
parliamentary committee is looking into the division of functions between 
different levels in society, and the question of how to create a stable base 
for financing welfare services is included in that. A first report will be 
presented on December 15. 
 
 
7.9 Cost and income equalization between municipalities  is also likely to be a 
hot issue, perhaps also the balance between general and ear-marked 
grants. However, I don’t know of any discussion about the income tax. 
There has been the occasional voice during the last few years about the 
advantages of a local property tax, but this has always resulted in nothing. 
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8.0  Technical Annexes 
 
Data for the paper have been drawn from the following sources: 
 
(a) Limitations of local taxation, financial equalisation and methods for 
calculating general grants (Local and Regional authorities in Europe, No 65 – 
Council of Europe)  (“Limitations of Local Taxation”);  
 
(b) The financial resources of local authorities in relation to their responsibilities: 
a litmus test for subsidiarity (4th General Report on Political Monitoring of the 
Implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, 
Rapporteur Mr Jean-Claude Frécon, Strasbourg, 20 April 2000) (“Council of 
Europe (2000)”) 
 
(c) Local Government Finance in OECD Countries (Janice Caulfield, paper 
presented to ‘Local Government at the Millennium’ International Seminar 
February 19th, 2000, University of New South Wales) (“Local Government 
Finance 2000”) 
 
(d) Taxing Powers of State and Local Government – OECD Tax Policy Studies – 
No 1 (“OECD Tax Policy Studies – No 1”) 
 
(e) Fiscal Design across Levels of Government: European Perspectives – OECD 
Presentation by Jeffrey Owens on “Local Government in England: Balance of 
Funding Review”, London June 2003 (“OECD Presentation 2003”) 
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Annex 1 
Local budgets in relation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and to General 
Government Expenditure (GGE)  
Country Initials % 
GDP 
% 
GGE 
Reference 
year 
%GDP %GGE Reference 
year 
Albania AL 7.7 25.4 1995       
Austria A 12.71 20.18 1993 12 15.2 1994 
Belgium B 4.9 10.9 1993 7.4 11.2 1995 
Bulgaria BG 9 20 1994       
Cyprus CY 1.4 4.1 1993       
Croatia CR             
Czech Republic CS 9.3 20.9 1994       
Denmark1 DK 19.9 31.28 1994       
Estonia EE 7.1 17.6 1994       
Finland SF 18 29.5 1993 23     
France F 5.54 27.22 1992 9.2 19 1995 
Germany D 8.12 28.69 1993 10 16.7 1995 
Greece GR 3.33 5.6 1989 2.1 5.6 1995 
Hungary H 17 53 1994   14.1 1997 
Iceland IS 9.1 22.3 1994   22 1996 
Ireland IRL 4.9 13.8 1994 5.4   1994 
Italy I 7 13 1993 13.7   1995 
Latvia LV 12.45 24 1994   19 1997 
Lithuania LT 13.1 58.8 1993 10 35.2 1996 
Luxembourg L 9.92 32.3 1993 11.7   1994 
Malta M 0.337 0.629 1995   2 1996/7 
Moldova MOL             
Netherlands NL 13.3 23.1 1994 19.1 36.2 1994 
Norway2 N 18.9 60 1994 11 40   
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Poland PLK 7 21.6 1994       
Portugal P 4.6 9.7 1993 3.7 12 1994 
Romania RO 3.5 16.9 1993       
Russian Fed SU             
Saint-Marino SM 0.11 0.19 1993       
Slovakia SL 4.79 11.78 1994       
Slovenia SV 4.4 10.1 1995   10 1995 
Spain E 4.87 12.17 1994 7.2   1995 
Sweden S 27.5 38 1994 28.7   1994 
Switzerland CH 10.8 27.9 1993       
Ex rep of 
Macedonia 
FYR         1.46 1995 
Turkey TR 2.41 12.3 1992 3.3   1996 
Ukraine UKR             
United Kingdom UK 11 27 1994 10 25 1994/5 
Average   8.91 22.12         
Source: Table 1, para 4.1, section IV, Council of Europe 2000 
Notes: 
1: If social security expenditure were included, which is reimbursed 100%, Danish 
municipality expenditure would represent, according to KJ, 26.9% of GDP and 42.3% 
of GGE. 
 
2: KJ decided to include counties in their statistics, claiming that Oslo which is both a 
commune and a county, represented alone nearly half the municipality expenditure. 
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Annex 2 
 
Decentralisation profiles – Sub-national expenditure levels (% GDP)  
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Source: Slide no 2, OECD (2003) 
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Annex 3 
 
Local Government Total Revenue, 1980 and 1995 (% GDP) 
 
Local Government Total Revenue, 1980 and 1995 (%GDP)
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Note: For key to country name abbreviations see Annex 12. 
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Annex 4 
The origin of the resources in local budgets  
 
Country Initials Local 
taxes 
Fees and 
charges 
Transfers Capital 
raising 
Other 
Albania AL 2.50 3.00 94.00 0.00 0.50 
Austria A 16.30 21.00 43.70 10.00 9.00 
Belgium B 40.75 6.00 44.26 0.00 8.99 
Bulgaria BG 1.00 10.00 78.00 2.00 9.00 
Cyprus CY 25.00 33.00 30.00 12.00 0.00 
Croatia CR           
Czech Republic CS 16.00 12.00 45.00 11.00 16.00 
Denmark DK 52.20 22.30 24.50 0.00 1.00 
Estonia EE 0.10 0.90 91.00 2.00 6.00 
Finland SF 39.50 24.00 28.40 5.60 2.50 
France F 42.00 8.00 29.00 9.00 12.00 
Germany D 35.00 4.00 32.00 7.00 0.00 
Greece GR 27.00 8.00 63.00 2.00 0.00 
Hungary H 13.00 8.17 63.61 6.71 8.51 
Iceland IS 16.00 21.00 57.00 0.00 7.00 
Ireland IRL 64.20 18.00 5.40 4.60 7.80 
Italy I 31.00 11.00 42.00 7.00 10.00 
Latvia LV 65.00 1.00 29.00 0.00 5.00 
Lithuania LT 6.40 0.00 87.30 0.00 6.30 
Luxembourg L 32.88 24.88 33.16 8.00 0.00 
Malta M 0.50 0.00 97.80 0.00 1.70 
Moldova MOL           
Netherlands NL 15.00 2.00 83.00 0.00 0.00 
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Norway N 47.50 12.80 36.20 0.00 3.50 
Poland PLK 21.00 7.00 60.00 0.00 12.00 
Portugal P 23.00 10.80 49.30 7.50 9.40 
Romania RO 5.00 16.00 79.00 0.00 0.00 
Russian Fed SU 22.00 2.50 72.50 0.00 3.00 
Saint-Marino SM 0.00 0.00 31.00 69.00 0.00 
Slovakia SL 10.00 9.00 39.00 5.00 37.00 
Slovenia SV 6.80 13.90 79.30 0.00 0.00 
Spain E 29.80 18.50 27.10 14.90 9.70 
Sweden S 56.00 15.00 20.00 0.00 9.00 
Switzerland CH 46.00 24.00 18.00 3.00 9.00 
Ex rep of Macedonia FYR 62.30 28.80 1.50 0.00 7.40 
Turkey TR 4.76 20.90 48.86 0.00 25.48 
Ukraine UKR           
United Kingdom UK 25.00 11.00 53.00 8.00 4.00 
Average   25.73 12.24 49.03 5.55 6.88 
Average for data 
gathered by CDLR  
  18.33 11.72 50.88 6.94 12.14 
       
 
Source: para 5.2, Section V, Council of Europe (2000) 
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Annex 5 
 
Breakdown of Transfers – Figures as a percentage of general municipal revenue  
  
Country Initials Shared taxes General Grants Specific Grants Other 
Albania AL 1 59 29 5 
Austria A 26 1 0 8 
Belgium B 0 25 5 10 
Bulgaria BG 34 37 7 0 
Cyprus CY 0 7 22 1 
Croatia CR 
        
Czech Republic CS 23 8 10 4 
Denmark DK 2 12 0 11 
Estonia EE 60 27 4 0 
Finland SF 1 28 1 0 
France F 0 24 0 2 
Germany D 17 15 13 0 
Greece GR 25 25 0 8 
Hungary H 7 52 5 2 
Iceland IS 43 7 1 2 
Ireland IRL 0 11 46 0 
Italy I 2 8 24 5 
Latvia LV 23 35 6 3 
Lithuania LT 
        
Luxembourg L 24 2 0 11 
Malta M 0 91 0 7 
Moldova MOL 
        
Netherlands NL 0 54 4 3 
Norway N 0 17 14 2 
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Poland PL 23 22 15 0 
Portugal P 1 31 4 2 
Romania RO 33 25 21 0 
Russian Fed SU 
        
Saint-Marino SM 0 31 0 0 
Slovakia SL 30 1 8 0 
Slovenia SV 
        
Spain E 0 8 29 0 
Sweden S 0 11 8 0 
Switzerland CH 1 3 14 0 
Ex rep of Macedonia FYR 
        
Turkey TR 3 0 3 51 
Ukraine UKR 
        
United Kingdom UK 17 32 27 0 
Average 
  
12.77 22.87 10.32 4.42 
 
Source: Table 4, para 7.1.1, section VII, Council of Europe (2000) 
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Annex 6 
 
Breakdown of general and specific grants paid to municipalities by purpose 
(amounts expressed as a percentage of total municipal receipts)  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Table 5, pages 38 and 39 Limitations of Local Taxation 
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Annex 7 
 
Breakdown of general grant paid to municipalities by allocation criteria  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Table 6, pages 40 and 41 Limitations of Local Taxation 
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Annex 8 
 
Taxes of sub-central government by type of tax autonomy 1995 (*, #)  
 
Sub-central government taxes 
as percent of total tax revenues 
 
Sub-central government tax revenues by type of tax autonomy 
(@) 
 a b c d.1 d.2 d.3 d.4 e 
 
Austria 19       
- Local Government 8 9 11   81    
- Länder 10 2    98    
          
Belgium 28       
- Local Government 6 13 84    2 1  
- communities 13  3   97    
- regional government 10 8 92       
          
Czech Republic 13         
- municipalities 13 2 5 3   90   
          
Denmark 31       
- municipalities 22  96    4  0 
- countries 9  93      7 
          
Finland 22       
- local government 22  89    11   
- region Ǻland 0 100        
          
Germany 29       
- local government 7 1 52   47    
- Länder 22     100    
          
Hungary 6       
- local government 6  30     70  
          
Iceland 20       
- local government 20 8 92       
          
Japan 24       
- municipalities 16 0 94      6 
- prefectures 8 0 83      17 
          
Mexico 20       
- local government  4      74 26  
- states 16 14    86    
          
Netherlands 3         
- Municipalities 1  100       
- polder boards 1  100       
- provinces 0  100       
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New Zealand 5         
- local government 5 98       2 
          
Norway 20       
- Municipalities 13  5    1 94  
- countries 6       100  
          
Poland 7       
- local government 7  45 1   54   
          
Portugal 6       
- local government 3 49 14      37 
- regions 2        100 
          
Spain 13       
- local government 9 33 51   16    
- regions 5 15 7   78    
          
Sweden 32       
- municipalities 22 4 96       
- parishes 0 2 98       
- country councils 11  100       
          
Switzerland 38       
- communtieis 16  97    3   
- cantons 22 89    6 5   
          
United Kingdom 4         
- local government 4  100       
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Source: Table 1, pages 14 and 15 of OECD Tax Policy Studies – No 1 
 
* Revenue figures for sub-central government may slightly differ from those published in the 
1998 editions of Revenue Statistics, due to revisions. Figures may not add due to rounding 
# Government levels ranked by increasing geographical scale. 
@ a = SCG sets tax rate and tax base. 
 b = SCG sets tax rate only. 
 c = SCG sets tax base only. 
 d.1 = SCG determines revenue-split. 
 d.2 = revenue-split can only be changed with consent of SCG. 
d.3 = revenue-split fixed in legislation, may unilaterally be changed by central government. 
d.4 = revenue-split determined by central government as part of the annual budget process. 
e = central government sets rate and base of SCG tax. 
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Annex 9 
 
The different categories of local taxes* 
 
 Property tax Income 
tax 
Household 
tax 
Business and Trade Taxes Other 
 B NB   Consom-
mation 
Entre-
prises 
Muta-
tions 
 
Austria I E I E   I E    
Belgium F T  F T   F T  F T 
Denmark I E F E I E      
Finland I E  I T      
France I E I E  I E  I E  F T 
Former Y. Rep. 
of Macedonia 
 I A     I A  
Germany F T F T    F T   
Greece  I A   I A   F T 
Hungary I E       F T 
Ireland I E        
Iceland I E  I T     F E 
Italy I E    I E  F T 
Latvia I A I E       
Lithuania  I E      F E 
Luxembourg I E    I E   
Malta      I A   
Netherlands F E   F E    F E 
Norway F E      I E 
Portugal I A I E F E  I A  I A F A 
Russia  F E    F E  F E 
Slovenia F E     I E I E 
Spain I E   I E I E F E F E 
Sweden   I E     F T 
Turkey I A   I A   I A 
United Kingdom F E       
 
 
Source: Table, para 6.1.1, Section VI, Council of Europe (2000) 
 
*Key:  Tax: mandatory: I 
Tax: non-mandatory: F 
Rate: complete discretion: T 
Rate: limited discretion (imposed bracket or ceiling): E 
Rate: prescribed by State: A 
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Annex 10 
 
Composition of local fiscal revenue as a percentage (1994)  
 
 
 
Source: Table 2 page 17 Limitations of Local Taxation 
 
This table was prepared on the basis of figures published by the OECD in Revenue Statistics 1965- 
1995 (1996 edition). Social security contributions are not considered. Composite local taxes, such as 
business taxes, which are very high in Germany and France, are broken down into their components. 
The group of taxes on payroll and work force covers taxes paid by employers, employees or the self-
employed either as a proportion of payroll or as a fixed amount per person, which are not earmarked for 
social security expenditure. 
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Annex 11 
 
Local Government Tax Revenue as a % of GDP 1975, 1985 and 1997  
 
Local Government Tax Revenue as a % of GDP
1975, 1985 and 1997
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Source: page 9, Local Government Finance (2000) 
 
Note: For key to country name abbreviations see Annex 12 
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Annex 12 
 
Key to Country name abbreviations 
 
 AUS: Australia  DEN: Denmark JAP: Japan 
 AUT: Austria   FIN: Finland  LUX: Luxembourg 
 BEL : Belgium  FRA: France  NLD: The Netherlands 
 CAN: Canada   IRL: Ireland  NZL: New Zealand 
 DEU: Germany  ISL: Iceland  NOR: Norway 
 SWZ: Switzerland  ITA: Italy  ESP: Spain 
 SWE: Sweden   UKD: United Kingdom 
 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
60
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
 
9.0 General Bibliography  
 
 
Bibliography by author 
 
 
Aaberge R. et al. (2003), “To what extent do fiscal regimes equalize opportunities for income 
acquisition among citizens?”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp 539-565, 2003 
 
Agranoff R., McGuire, M. (2001) “American Federalism and the Search for Models of Management”, 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 61, No. 6, November/December 2001 
 
Azis I.J., Schroeder, L., Silver, C. (2001) “Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralisation in 
Indonesia”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 37, pp 345-362, December 2001 
 
Baretti C., Huber, B., Lichtblau, K. (2002) “A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of 
Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany”, International Tax and Public Finance, 2002, 
Vol. 9, pp 631-649 
 
Blom-Hansen J. (1998), “Macroeconomic Control of Local Government in Scandinavia: The Formative 
Years” , Scandinavian Political Studies, 1 June 1998, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp 129-159 
 
Boadway R. et al (2003), “Equalization and Decentralisation of Revenue-Raising in a Federation”, 
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 5(2), pp 201-228, 2003 
 
Boadway R. (2001), The imperative of fiscal sharing transfers, Unesco 2001. (Blackwell Publishers) 
 
Borck R., Owings S. (2003) “The political economy of intergovernmental grants”, Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, Vol. 33, Issue 2, pp 139-156, March 2003 
 
Borge L-E., Rattso, J. (1997) “Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics 
in Norway 1900 – 1990”, Public Choice, July 1997, Vol. 92, Nos 1/2, pp 181-197 
 
Breton A., Fraschini, A. “Vertical Competition in Unitary States: the Case of Italy”, Public Choice, vol. 
114, Nos 1-2, pp 57-77, January 2003 
 
Brown A.J., “Introduction – Building Local Government”, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 61(4), pp 3-4, December 2002 
 
Buettner T., “Tax base effects and fiscal externalities of local capital taxation: evidence from a panel of 
German jurisdictions”, Journal of Urban Economics, 2003, Vol. 54, pp 110-128 
 
Calabrese S.M., “Local Redistribution Financed by Income Tax”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 29, No. 
4, pp 259-303, July 2001 
 
Cameron R., “Central-Local Financial Relations in South Africa”, Local Government Studies, Autumn 
2002, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 113-134 
 
Carmichael, P., Midwinter, A. (2002) “Central Grants and Local Spending in Britain: A Reappraisal of 
the Post-Layfield Period”, Local Government Studies, Autumn 2002, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 49-73 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
61
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
 
Caulfield J. (2000), “Local Government Finance in OECD Countries”, Paper presented to Local 
Government at the Millenium  International Seminar, 19th February 2000, University of New 
South Wales 
 
Chen S. (2000), “The need for autonomy: Reforming local government funding”, New Economy, 2000, 
Article 19, pp 83-87 
 
Correa García M.D., Maluquer I Amorós (2003) Effectos regionales del presupuesto europeo en 
España (actualizacíon 1986-1999): Flujos financieros y balanzas fiscales entre las 
communidades autónomas y elpresupuesto de la Unión Europea, (Publication: Barcelona: 
Generalit de Catalunya, Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2003) 
 
Council of Europe (2000), “The financial resources of local authorities in relation to their 
responsibilities: a litmus test for subsidiarity”, 4th General Report on Political Monitoring of the 
Implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, Rapporteur, Mr Jean-
Claude Frécon, Strasbourg, 20 April 2000. 
 
Council of Europe - CDLR (1999), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in the 
UK  – Situation in 1999, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1999  
 
Council of Europe - CDLR (1998), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Germany  – Situation in 1998, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and 
Regional Democracy, 1998  
 
Council of Europe - CDLR (1999), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Austria  – Situation in 1999, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, December 1999  
 
Council of Europe - CDLR (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Switzerland  – Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and 
Regional Democracy, 1997  
 
Council of Europe – CDLR (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
France  – Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy,1997  
 
Council of Europe - CDLR (1998), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in the 
Netherlands  – Situation in 1998, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and 
Regional Democracy,1998  
 
Council of Europe - CDLR (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Norway  – Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997  
 
Council of Europe - CDLR (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Denmark  – Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and 
Regional Democracy, 1997 
 
Council of Europe – CDLR (1996), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Sweden  – Situation in 1996, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1996 
 
Council of Europe – CDLR (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Finland  – Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997  
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
62
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
 
Council of Europe – CDLR (1996), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Spain  – Situation in 1996, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1996  
 
Council of Europe – CDLR (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in 
Portugal  – Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997  
 
Council of Europe – CDLR (1999), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Italy  
– Situation in 1999, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1999  
 
Council of Europe, Recommendation 122 (2002) on local democracy in Malta, Adopted by the 
Standing Committee of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 14 November 
2002 
 
Council of Europe, Recommendation 87 (2001) on local and regional democracy in Lithuania, 
Adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 30 May 2001 
 
Council of Europe (2002), Recommendation 120 (2002) on local and regional democracy in Poland, 
Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
Europe 14 November 2002 
 
Council of Europe (2001), Recommendation 96 (2001) on local democracy in Cyprus, Approved by the 
Chamber of Local Authorities 30 May 2001; Adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 31 May 2001 
 
Council of Europe, Recommendation 116 (2002) on regional democracy in Hungary, Approved by the 
Chamber of Local Authorities 4 June 2002; Adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 6 June 2002 
 
Council of Europe, Resolution 142 (2002) on regional democracy in Hungary, Approved by the 
Chamber of Local Authorities 4 June 2002; Adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 6 June 2002 
 
Council of Europe, Recommendation 77 (2000) on local and regional democracy in the Czech 
Republic, Adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 25 May 2000 
 
Council of Europe, Resolution 93 (2000) on local and regional democracy in the Czech Republic, 
Adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 25 May 2000 
 
Council of Europe, Limitations of local taxation, financial equalisation and methods for calculating 
general grants, Local and regional authorities in Europe, No 65 (Council of Europe Publishing) 
 
Council of Europe, Effects on the financial autonomy of local and regional authorities resulting from 
the limits set at European level on national public debt, Local and regional authorities in 
Europe, No. 71 (Council of Europe Publishing) 
 
Council of Europe, Local finance in Europe, Local and regional authorities in Europe, No. 61 (Council 
of Europe Publishing) 
 
Council of Europe, The risks arising from local authorities’ financial obligations, Local and regional 
authorities in Europe, No. 76,  Report by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy (Council of Europe Publishing) 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
63
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Council of Europe, Budgetary procedures and budget management at local authority level, Report by 
the Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy in collaboration with J-F Husson, 
(Council of Europe Publishing) 
 
Council of Europe (2002) Report on Regional Democracy in Hungary, Monitoring Report 2002 CPR 
(9) 2, Part II, (author: Olbrycht J.) 
 
Council of Europe (2002) Report on Local and Regional Democracy in Poland, Monitoring Report 
2002 CG (9) 21 Part II”  (author: Doric M)  
 
Council of Europe (2001) Report on the situation of Local and Regional Democracy in Lithuania, 
Monitoring Report 2001 CG (8) 4, Part II” (authors: Masters O., Roppe, L.) 
 
Council of Europe (2001) Report on Local Democracy in Cyprus, Monitoring Report 2001 CPL (8) 3, 
Part II” (author: Micallef I.) 
 
Council of Europe (2000) Report on Local and Regional Democracy in the Czech Republic, 
Monitoring Report 2000 CG (7) 4 rev Part II” (author: Cuatrecasas L.) 
 
Council of Europe (2002) Report on Local Democracy Malta, Monitoring Report 2002 CPL (9) 7, Part 
II” (author: Paas R.) 
 
de Mello L.R. (2001), “Fiscal Decentralization and Borrowing Costs: The Case of Local 
Governments”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp 108-138, March 2001 
 
de Mello, Jr L.R (2002), “Public finance, government spending and economic growth: the case of local 
governments in Brazil”, Applied Economics, Vol. 34, pp1871-1883, 2002 
 
de Vries J., Yesilkagit, A.K. (2002) “The unanticipated consequences of decentralization and 
reinvention: the case of the Province of South Holland”, International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 2002, Vol. 68, pp579-597 
 
Devillanova C., “Decentramento fiscale e debito pubblico: una nota interpretativa”, Working 
papers/Centro di Ricerca sull’Economia del Settore Pubblico (Econpubblica) V. 47,  1996 
 
Direction générale des collectivités locales (1999), Les Finances des communes de plus de 10,000 
habitants, (Editeur: Paris: La Documentation française 1999, Collection statistique et finances 
locales) 
 
Direction générale des collectivités locales, service des statistiques, des études et des techniques locales 
(1999), Les finances des groupements de communes à fiscalité propre: intercommunalité, 
(Editeur: Paris: Direction générale des collectivités locales, 2001, Collection statistique et 
finances locales) 
 
Direction générale des collectivités locales, service des statistiques, des études et des techniques locales 
(1999), Les Finances des communes de moins de 10,000 habitants, (Editeur: Paris: La 
Documentation française – 1997 Collection statistique et finances locales) 
 
Dollery B.E. (2001), The political economy of local government,( Great Britain : Edward Elgar, 2001  ) 
 
Dougherty M.J., Klase, K.A., Song S.G. “Managerial Necessity and the Art of Creating Surpluses: The 
Budget-Execution Process in West Virginia Cities”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 63, No. 
4, pp 484-497, July/August 2003 
 
Dowall D.E. (2001), “Rethinking Statewide Infrastructure Policies: Lessons from California and 
Beyond”, Public Works Management & Policy, July 2001, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp 5-17 
 
Dyson (1980) 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
64
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
 
Emmerson C., Hall, J. (1998) Modernising Local Democracy: A Response to the Government’s 
Consultation Process on Local Government, (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, May 1998) 
 
Fane G. (2003), “Change and Continuity in Indonesia’s New Fiscal Decentralisation Arrangements”, 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp 159-176, August 2003 
 
Fischel W. (2001), The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government 
Taxation, School Finance and Land-Use Policies, (Harvard University Press, 2001) 
 
Flochel L., Madies, T. (2002) “Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping 
Revenue Maximizing Governments”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp 
121-141, March 2002 
 
Forge A. (2003), Modernising Local Government Finance: a Green Paper Consulting with an Open 
Mind?, (Reed Elsevier (UK) Limited 2003) 
 
Fossati A. (2001), “L’Italia e il federalismo”, Economia pubblica 2001, V. 31, No. 1, pp 5-32 
 
Gaillard S., Oesch, D. (2002) “What explains the Differences in the Tax Burden between Swiss 
Cantons?”, Swiss Political Science Review, June 2002, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp 81-99 
 
Garcia-Milà T., Mc Guire, T.J. “Do Interregional Transfers Improve the Economic Performance of 
Poor Regions? The Case of Spain”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp 
281-296 
 
Goddard A., (1997) “Organizational Culture and Budget Related Behavior: A Comparative 
Contingency Study of Three Local Government Organizations”, The International Journal of 
Accounting, 1997, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp 79-97 
 
Gordo L., Hernandez de Cos, P. (2000) El sistema de financiación autonómica vigente para el período 
1997-2001, (Publication: Madrid: Banco de España, 2000) 
 
Guerrieri G., Mancini, A. (1991) “I flussi della finanza locale negli anni ’80: tendenze e prospettive”, 
Economia Pubblica Milano, Anno 21, No. 12, Dicembre 1991, pp 645-658 
 
Gustaffson B., Kjulin, U., Schwarz, B. “Central-Local Government Relations in Transition: The Case 
of Swedish Child Care”, Public Choice, Vol. 110, Nos 3-4, pp 305-325 
 
Hallerberg, M. (2002) “Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Policy” in Handbook of Public Administration, B. Guy 
Peters, John Pierre (eds) (London: Sage 2002) 
 
Hambleton R. et al (2002) Globalism and Local Democracy: Challenge and Change in Europe and 
North America, (Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
 
Hauff V. (1992), Global denken, lokal handeln: ein politisches fazit, (Editeur: Kiepenheur und Witsch 
1992) 
 
Hendriks, Frank and Tops, Pieter “Between Democracy and Efficiency: Trends in Local Government 
Reform in the Netherlands and Germany”, Public Administration, Vol. 77, no. 1, 133-153 
 
Hertzog R. (1991), “A propos de la péréquation dans les finances locales”, Revue française de finances 
publiques 1991, Vol. 34, pp 57-77 
 
H-y Chu (2003), “The Dual-Illusion of Grants-in-Aid on Central and Local Expenditures”, Public 
Choice, Vol. 114, Nos 3-4, pp 349-359, March 2003 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
65
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Jin J., Zou, H.-f  (2001) “How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national and sub-national 
government size?”, Journal of Urban Economics, September 2001, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp 270-293 
 
Joassart-Marcelli, P., Musso, J.A. (2001) “The Distributive Impact of Federal Fiscal Policy – Federal 
Spending and Southern California Cities”, Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp 163-183, 
November 2001 
 
John P. (2001), “Political manipulation in a majoritarian democracy: central government targeting of 
public funds to English sub-national government,  in space and across time”, British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, October 2001, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp 308-339 
 
Kalseth J., Rattso, J. (1995) “Spending and overspending in local government administration: A 
minimum requirement approach to Norway”, European Journal of Political Economy, June 
1995, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp 239-251 
 
King D., Stoker, G. (1996) Rethinking Local Democracy, (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) 
 
Koren S., Stiassny, A. (1998) “Tax and Spend or Spend and Tax? An International Study”, Journal of 
Policy Modelling, April 1998, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp 163-191 
 
Korthals Altes W. (2002), “Local Government and the Decentralisation of Urban Regeneration Policies 
in the Netherlands”, Urban Studies, 2002, Vol. 39, No. 8, pp 1439-1452 
 
Köthenbürger M. (2002), “Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization”, International Tax and Public 
Finance, Vol. 9, pp 391-408, 2002 
 
Kunce M. (2002), “A Nash tax game extending the generality of the Henry George Theorem”, 
Economics Letters, Vol. 66, Issue 2, pp229-233, February 2000 
 
Lewis B.D. (2003), “Tax and Charge Creation by Regional Governments under Fiscal Decentralisation: 
Estimates and Explanations”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp 177-
192, August 2003 
 
Loughlin, John and Alain Delcamp (2003) (eds)  La Decentralisation dans les Etats de l’Union 
européenne, (Paris: La Documentation Française 2003) 
 
Loughlin, John and Sonia Mazey, (eds.) (1995), The End of the French Unitary State: Ten Years of 
Regionalization (1982-1992). (London: Frank Cass). 
Loughlin, John et al. (2001), Sub-national Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and 
Opportunities, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Luja R.H.C. (2002), “Fiscale staatssteun: recente ontwikkelingen”, Weekblad voor fiscaal recht 2002, 
jaarg. 131, N. 6507, 5 december, pp 1752-1757 
 
Litwack J. M., (2002), “Central Control of Regional Budgets: Theory with Applications to Russia”, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 30, pp 51-75, 2002 
 
Martinez-Vazquez J., McNabb, R. (2003) “Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth”, World 
Development, Vol. 31, Issue 9, pp 1597-1616, September 2003 
 
McGovern M., Pickernell, D. (2002) “Begging Bowl Meets Baseball Bat? Lessons for the UK from the 
Australian Fiscal Model”, Policy Review Section pp 703-707, Regional Studies Association, 
2002 
 
Müller C., “Tax Competition and Direct Democracy in Swiss Cantons”, Swiss Political Science 
Review, July 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp 107-120 
 
Musgrave, R. A. (1973), Public Finance in Theory and Practice. (New York: McGraw Hill). 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
66
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
 
Nam C.W., Parsche, R. “Municipal Finance in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary: Institutional Framework and Recent Development”, MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy 
in Transitional Economies, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp 143-164 
 
Oates W (2001 ed., Property Taxation and Local Government Finance: Essays in honor of C. Lowell 
Harriss, 2001 
 
Observatoire des finances locales (France) (1997), Les Finances des collectivités locales, (Editeur: 
Observatoire des finances locales 1997, Collection: Les Rapports de l’Observatoire) 
 
Observatoire des finances locales (1997), Bourdin J. , Les Finances des collectivités territoriales en 
1996, (Editeur: Observatoire des finances locales (1997) Collection: Collection Les Rapports de 
l’Observatoire) 
 
OECD (2002), “Public Spending in Italy: Policies to enhance its effectiveness”, OECD Economic 
Surveys, vol. 2002, No. 4, pp 83-128, January 2002 
 
OECD (2002), “OECD Tax Policy Studies -  Fiscal Design Surveys across Levels of Government No 
7: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania”, OECD Transition Economies,  
January 2002, pp 1-62 
 
OECD (2002), “Non-tax revenue, capital revenue and grants”, OECD Revenue Statistics of OECD 
Member Countries, Vol. 2002, Release 1, October 2002 
 
OECD (2003), “Fiscal Designs across Levels of Government: European Perspectives” – Presentation 
by Jeffrey Owens on Local Government in England: Balance of Funding Review, London, June, 
2003 
 
OECD (undated), “Taxing Powers of State and Local Government”, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No 1 
 
Ordóñes Solís D. (1999), “Descentralización nacional y Unión Europea desde la perspectiva española”, 
Communidad Europea Aranzadi, Pamplona, Año 26, No. 11, Noviembre 1999, pp 31-43 
 
Oulasvirta L. (1997), “Real and perceived effects of changing the grant system from specific to general 
grants”, Public Choice, Vol. 91, Nos 3/4, pp 397-416, June 1997 
 
Pavan A. (1995), Riflessioni sulla democrazia locale, (Publication: Gorle: C.E.L., 1995) 
 
Pereira P.T.C. (1996), “A politico-economic approach to intergovernmental lump-sum grants”, Public 
Choice, Vol. 88, Nos 1/2, pp 185-201, 1996 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), “Local Government Grant Distribution” 
 
Rattso J .,ed,  Fiscal Federalism and State-Local Finance: The Scandinavian Perspective,  (Edward 
Elgar) 
 
Revelli F. (2003), “Reaction or interaction? Spatial process identification in multi-tiered government 
structures”, Journal of Urban Economics, 2003, Vol. 53, pp 29-53 
 
Ring I. (2001), “Ecological public functions and fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany”, 
Ecological Economics, September 2002, Vol. 42, Issue 3, pp 415-427 
 
Rubinfeld D.L. (2001), “Structuring Intergovernmental Grants to Local Governments: Lessons from 
South Africa”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp 173-187, June 2001 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
67
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Sato M. (2002), “Intergovernmental Transfers, Governance Structure and Fiscal Decentralization”, The 
Japanese Economic Review, Vol 53, No. 1, pp 55-76, March 2002 
 
Sato M. (2003), “Tax competition, rent-seeking and fiscal decentralization”, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp19-40, February 2003 
 
Schneider M. (2002), “Local fiscal equalisation based on fiscal capacity: the Case of Austria”, Fiscal 
Studies, March 2002, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 105-133 
 
Sitte R. (2000), “Vieles besser, aber nicht alles anders: zur finanz und sozialpolitischen strategie der 
rot-grünen koalition”, Jahrg., 06-2000, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp 355-364 
 
Smith J. (2002), “Redistribution and Federal Finance”, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 42, 
No. 3, pp 284 – 311, November 2002 
 
Sokolow A.D. (2000), “The Changing Property Tax in the West: State Centralization of Local 
Finances”, Public Budgeting & Finance, Spring 2000 pp 85-104 
 
SØrensen R.J. (2003), “The political economy of intergovernmental grants: The Norwegian case”, 
European Journal of Political Research, 2003, Vol. 42, pp163-195 
 
Spithoven A.H.G.M (1998), “J. Zijlstra: The structural financing of government expenditure”, 
International Journal of Social Economics, 9 October 1998, Vol. 25, No. 9, pp 1398-1410 
 
Stoker, G. and Meehan, E. (2003)  Local finance: guiding principles in context.  Paper  prepared for 
Balance of Funding Review. 
 
Tiebout, C.M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 64, p. 5. 
 
Van Norden G.J. (2002), “Fiscale eenheid voor de BTW uitgebreid”, Weekblad voor fiscaal recht 2002, 
V. 131, N. 6502, 31 oktober, pp 1541-1548 
 
Wälti S. (2003), “The impact of the financial relations on the federal dynamic: the mediative quality of 
Swiss federalism”, Swiss Political Science Review, April 2003, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 91-108 
 
Wehner J. (2003) , “The Institutional Politics of Revenue Sharing in South Africa”, Regional and 
Federal Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp1-30, Spring 2003 
 
Wieland J. (2000), “Problemi del federalismo fiscale”, Regioni Bologna Anno 28, No. 2, Aprile 2000, 
pp 389-403 
 
Wollmann, Hellmut (2000) “Local Government Modernization in Germany: Between Incrementalism 
and Reform Waves”, Public Administration, Vol. 78, no. 4, 2000, pp. 915-936) 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
68
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Bibliography by country  
UK 
 
Chen, S. (2000), “The need for autonomy: Reforming local government funding”, New Economy, 2000, 
Article 19, pp 83-87 
 
Midwinter, A., Carmichael, P. (2002) “Central Grants and Local Spending in Britain: A Reappraisal of 
the Post-Layfield Period” Local Government Studies, Autumn 2002, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 49-73 
 
John, P., Ward, H. (2001) “Political manipulation in a majoritarian democracy: central government 
targeting of public funds to English subnational government,  in space and across time”, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, October 2001, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp 308-339 
 
Forge, A. (2003) Modernising Local Government Finance: a Green Paper Consulting with an Open 
Mind? (UK: Reed Elsevier (UK) Limited 2003) 
 
Emmerson, C.,  Hall, J. (1998) Modernising Local Democracy: A Response to the Government’s 
Consultation Process on Local Government (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, May 1998) 
 
Council of Europe (1999) Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in the UK  – 
Situation in 1999, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1999 
 
Revelli, F. (2003) “Reaction or interaction? Spatial process identification in multi-tiered government 
structures”, Journal of Urban Economics, 2003, Vol. 53, pp 29-53 
 
Germany 
 
Baretti, C., Huber, B., Lichtblau, K. (2002) “A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of 
Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany” International Tax and Public Finance, 2002, 
Vol. 9, pp 631-649 
 
Ring, I. (2002) “Ecological public functions and fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany”, 
Ecological Economics, September 2002, Vol. 42, Issue 3, pp 415-427 
 
Buettner, T., “Tax base effects and fiscal externalities of local capital taxation: evidence from a panel 
of German jurisdictions”, Journal of Urban Economics, 2003, Vol. 54, pp 110-128 
 
Council of Europe (1998), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Germany  – 
Situation in 1998, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1998 
 
 
Sitte, R. (2000) “Vieles besser, aber nicht alles anders: zur finanz und sozialpolitischen strategie der 
rot-grünen koalition”, Jahrg., 06-2000, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp 355-364 
 
Hauff, V., Global denken, lokal handeln: ein politisches fazit, Editeur: Kiepenheur und Witsch 1992 
 
Wollmann, Hellmut (2000) “Local Government Modernization in Germany: Between Incrementalism 
and Reform Waves”, Public Administration, Vol. 78, no. 4, 2000, pp. 915-936) 
 
Austria 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
69
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Schneider, M. (2002) “Local fiscal equalisation based on fiscal capacity: the Case of Austria”, Fiscal 
Studies, March 2002, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 105-133 
 
Council of Europe (1999), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Austria  – 
Situation in 1999, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, December 1999 
 
Switzerland 
 
Oesch, D., Gaillard, S. (2002) “What explains the Differences in the Tax Burden between Swiss 
Cantons?” Swiss Political Science Review, June 2002, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp 81-99 
 
Müller, C. (2003)  “Tax Competition and Direct Democracy in Swiss Cantons”, Swiss Political Science 
Review, July 2003, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp 107-120 
 
Wälti, S. (2003), “The impact of the financial relations on the federal dynamic: the mediative quality of 
Swiss federalism”, Swiss Political Science Review, April 2003, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 91-108 
 
Council of Europe (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Switzerland  
– Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997 
 
France 
 
Council of Europe (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in France  – 
Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy,1997 
 
Direction générale des collectivités locales, service des statistiques, des études et des techniques locales 
(1999), Les finances des groupements de communes à fiscalité propre: intercommunalité, 
(Editeur: Paris: Direction générale des collectivités locales, Collection statistique et finances 
locales) 
 
Observatoire des finances locales (France) (1997), Les Finances des collectivités locales, (Editeur: 
Observatoire des finances locales (1997), Collection Les Rapports de l’Observatoire) 
 
Observatoire des finances locales, collaboration Bourdin, J., Giraud, P (France) (1997), Les Finances 
des collectivités territoriales en 1996, (Editeur: Observatoire des finances locales, Collection 
Les Rapports de l’Observatoire) 
  
Direction générale des collectivités locales, service des statistiques, des études et des techniques locales 
(1999), Les Finances des communes de moins de 10,000 habitants,  (Paris: La Documentation 
française, Collection: statistique et finances locales) 
 
Direction générale des collectivités locales, service des statistiques, des études et des techniques locales 
(1999), Les Finances des communes de plus de 10,000 habitants,  (Paris: La Documentation 
française, Collection: statistique et finances locales) 
 
Hertzog, R. (1991), “A propos de la péréquation dans les finances locales”, Revue française de finances 
publiques 1991, Vol. 34, pp 57-77 
 
Loughlin, John and Sonia Mazey, (eds.) (1995), The End of the French Unitary State: Ten Years of 
Regionalization (1982-1992). (London: Frank Cass). 
 
The Netherlands 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
70
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Korthals Altes, W. (2002) “Local Government and the Decentralisation of Urban Regeneration Policies 
in the Netherlands”, Urban Studies, 2002, Vol. 39, No. 8, pp 1439-1452 
 
Yesilkagit, A.K.,  De Vries, J. (2002) “The unanticipated consequences of decentralization and 
reinvention: the case of the Province of South Holland” International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 2002, Vol. 68, pp579-597  
 
Spithoven, A.H.G.M. (1998)  “J. Zijlstra: The structural financing of government expenditure” 
International Journal of Social Economics, 9 October 1998, Vol. 25, No. 9, pp 1398-1410 
 
Council of Europe (1998), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in the 
Netherlands  – Situation in 1998, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and 
Regional Democracy,1998 
 
Luja Fiscale, R.H.C. (2002), “Staatssteun: recente ontwikkelingen”, Weekblad voor fiscaal recht 2002, 
jaarg. 131, N. 6507, 5 december, pp 1752-1757 
 
Van Norden, G.J. (2002)  “Fiscale eenheid voor de BTW uitgebreid” Weekblad voor fiscaal recht 2002, 
V. 131, N. 6502, 31 oktober, pp 1541-1548 
 
Norway 
 
Sørensen, R. J. (2003) “The political economy of intergovernmental grants: The Norwegian case” 
European Journal of Political Research, 2003, Vol. 42, pp163-195 
 
Borge, L-E., Rattso, J. “Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in 
Norway 1900 – 1990”, Public Choice, July 1997, Vol. 92, Nos 1/2, pp 181-197 
 
Kalseth, J., J. Rattso (1995) “Spending and overspending in local government administration: A 
minimum requirement approach to Norway”, European Journal of Political Economy, June 
1995, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp 239-251 
 
Council of Europe (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Norway  – 
Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997 
 
Denmark 
 
Council of Europe (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Denmark  – 
Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997 
 
Sweden 
 
Kjulin, U., Schwarz, B., Gustaffson, B. “Central-Local Government Relations in Transition: The Case 
of Swedish Child Care”, Public Choice, Vol. 110, Nos 3-4, pp 305-325 
 
Council of Europe (1996), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Sweden  – 
Situation in 1996, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1996 
 
Finland 
 
Oulasvirta, L. (1997) “Real and perceived effects of changing the grant system from specific to general 
grants”, Public Choice, Vol. 91, Nos 3/4, pp 397-416, June 1997 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
71
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Council of Europe (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Finland  – 
Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997 
 
Scandinavia as a whole 
 
J. Rattso (ed), Fiscal Federalism and State-Local Finance: The Scandinavian Perspective  (Edward 
Elgar) 
 
Blom-Hansen, J. “Macroeconomic Control of Local Government in Scandinavia: The Formative 
Years”, Scandinavian Political Studies, 1 June 1998, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp 129-159 
 
Spain 
 
Garcia-Milà, T., McGuire, T.J., “Do Interregional Transfers Improve the Economic Performance of 
Poor Regions? The Case of Spain”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp 
281-296 
 
Council of Europe (1996), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Spain  – 
Situation in 1996, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1996 
 
Correa García, M. D., Maluquer i Amorós, S. (2003), Effectos regionales del presupuesto europeo en 
España (actualizacíon 1986-1999): Flujos financieros y balanzas fiscales entre las 
communidades autónomas y elpresupuesto de la Unión Europea (Publication: Barcelona: 
Generalit de Catalunya, Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2003) 
 
Hernandez de Cos, P., Gordo, L. (2000), El sistema de financiación autonómica vigente para el 
período 1997-2001 (Publication: Madrid: Banco de España, 2000) 
 
Ordóñes Solís, D. “Descentralización nacional y Unión Europea desde la perspectiva española”, 
Communidad Europea Aranzadi, Pamplona, Año 26, No. 11, Noviembre 1999, pp 31-43 
 
Portugal 
 
Pereira, P.T.C., “A politico-economic approach to intergovernmental lump-sum grants”, Public Choice, 
Vol. 88, Nos 1/2, pp 185-201, 1996 
 
Council of Europe (1997), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Portugal  – 
Situation in 1997, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1997 
 
Italy 
 
Breton, A. Fraschini, A.(2003), “Vertical Competition in Unitary States: the Case of Italy”, Public 
Choice, vol. 114, Nos 1-2, pp 57-77, January 2003 
 
OECD (2002), “Public Spending in Italy: Policies to enhance its effectiveness”, OECD Economic 
Surveys, vol. 2002, No. 4, pp 83-128, January 2002 
 
Council of Europe (1999), Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy in Italy  – 
Situation in 1999, Report adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy, 1999 
 
Wieland, J. (2000) “Problemi del federalismo fiscale”, Regioni Bologna Anno 28, No. 2, Aprile 2000, 
pp 389-403 
 
Fossati, A. “L’Italia e il federalismo”, Economia pubblica 2001, V. 31, No. 1, pp 5-32 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
72
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
 
Devillanova, C. (1996), “Decentramento fiscale e debito pubblico: una nota interpretativa”, Working 
papers/Centro di Ricerca sull’Economia del Settore Pubblico (Econpubblica) V. 47,  1996 
 
Pavan, A. (1995), Riflessioni sulla democrazia locale (Publication: Gorle: C.E.L., 1995) 
 
Mancini, A., Guerrieri, G., “I flussi della finanza locale negli anni ’80: tendenze e prospettive”, 
Economia Pubblica Milano, Anno 21, No. 12, Dicembre 1991, pp 645-658 
 
Poland/Slovak Republic/Czech Republic/Hungary/Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania 
 
Nam, C.W.,  Parsche R. “Municipal Finance in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary: Institutional Framework and Recent Development”, MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy 
in Transitional Economies, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp 143-164 
 
OECD (2002) “Tax Policy Studies Fiscal Design Surveys across Levels of Government No 7: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania”, OECD Transition Economies,  January 
2002, pp 1-62  
 
Reports on Local and Regional Democracy – Malta/Lithuania/Poland/Cyprus/Hungary/the 
Czech Republic 
 
Council of Europe, (2002), Report on Local Democracy Malta,  Monitoring Report 2002 CPL (9) 7, 
Part II (author: Paas, R.) 
 
Council of Europe (2002), Recommendation 122 (2002) on local democracy in Malta, Adopted by the 
Standing Committee of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 14 November 
2002 
 
Council of Europe, (2001), Report on the situation of Local and Regional Democracy in Lithuania, 
Monitoring Report 2001 CG (8) 4, Part II (authors: Masters, O., Roppe, L.) 
 
Council of Europe (2001),  Recommendation 87 (2001) on local and regional democracy in Lithuania, 
Adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 30 May 2001 
 
Council of Europe (2002), Report on Local and Regional Democracy in Poland, Monitoring Report 
2002 CG (9) 21 Part II (authors: Smith, K.,  Doric, M.) 
 
Council of Europe (2002), Recommendation 120 (2002) on local and regional democracy in Poland, 
Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
Europe 14 November 2002 
 
Council of Europe (2001), Report on Local Democracy in Cyprus, Monitoring Report 2001 CPL (8) 3, 
Part II (author: I. Micallef) 
 
Council of Europe (2001), Recommendation 96 (2001) on local democracy in Cyprus, Approved by the 
Chamber of Local Authorities 30 May 2001; Adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 31 May 2001 
 
Council of Europe (2002), Report on Regional Democracy in Hungary, Monitoring Report 2002 CPR 
(9) 2, Part II (author: Olbrycht, J.) 
 
Council of Europe (2002), Recommendation 116 (2002) on regional democracy in Hungary, Approved 
by the Chamber of Local Authorities 4 June 2002; Adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 6 June 2002 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
73
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Council of Europe (2002), Resolution 142 (2002) on regional democracy in Hungary, Approved by the 
Chamber of Local Authorities 4 June 2002; Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Congress 
of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 6 June 2002 
 
Council of Europe (2000), Report on Local and Regional Democracy in the Czech Republic, 
Monitoring Report 2000 CG (7) 4 rev Part II (authors: Cuatrecasas, L., Guegan, M.) 
 
Council of Europe (2000), Recommendation 77 (2000) on local and regional democracy in the Czech 
Republic, Adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 25 May 2000 
 
Council of Europe (2000), Resolution 93 (2000) on local and regional democracy in the Czech 
Republic, Adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 25 May 2000 
 
US 
 
Joassart-Marcelli, P., Musso, J.(2001), “The Distributive Impact of Federal Fiscal Policy – Federal 
Spending and Southern California Cities”, Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp 163-183, 
November 2001 
 
Dougherty, M.J. et al (2003), “Managerial Necessity and the Art of Creating Surpluses: The Budget-
Execution Process in West Virginia Cities”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp 
484-497, July/August 2003 
 
Agranoff, R., McGuire, M. (2001) “American Federalism and the Search for Models of Management”, 
Public Adminstration Review, Vol. 61, No. 6, November/December 2001 
 
Dowall, D.E. (2001) “Rethinking Statewide Infrastructure Policies: Lessons from California and 
Beyond”, Public Works Management & Policy, July 2001, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp 5-17 
 
Australia 
 
Pickernell, D., McGovern, M. (2002) “Begging Bowl Meets Baseball Bat? Lessons for the UK from 
the Australian Fiscal Model”, Policy Review Section pp 703-707, Regional Studies Association, 
2002 
 
Brown, A.J. (2002), “Introduction – Building Local Government”, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 61(4), pp 3-4, December 2002 
 
Smith, J. (2002), “Redistribution and Federal Finance”, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 42, 
No. 3, pp 284 – 311, November 2002 
 
Brazil 
 
de Mello, Jr, L.R. (2002) “Public finance, government spending and economic growth: the case of local 
governments in Brazil”, Applied Economics, Vol. 34, pp1871-1883, 2002 
 
South Africa 
 
Cameron, R. (2002), “Central-Local Financial Relations in South Africa”, Local Government Studies, 
Autumn 2002, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 113-134 
 
Wehner, J. (2003), “The Institutional Politics of Revenue Sharing in South Africa”, Regional and 
Federal Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp1-30, Spring 2003 
 
Rubinfeld, D.L. (2001), “Structuring Intergovernmental Grants to Local Governments: Lessons from 
South Africa”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp 173-187, June 2001 
 
Russia 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
74
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
 
Litwack, J.M. (2002), “Central Control of Regional Budgets: Theory with Applications to Russia”, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 30, pp 51-75, 2002 
 
Indonesia 
 
Silver, C., Azis, I.J., Schroeder, L. (2001) “Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralisation in 
Indonesia”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 37, pp 345-362, December 2001 
 
Fane, G. (2003) “Change and Continuity in Indonesia’s New Fiscal Decentralisation Arrangements”, 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp 159-176, August 2003 
 
Japan 
 
Sato, M. (2002), “Intergovernmental Transfers, Governance Structure and Fiscal Decentralization”, The 
Japanese Economic Review, Vol 53, No. 1, pp 55-76, March 2002 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
75
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Bibliography by issue 
 
Equalisation/Intergovernmental Grants 
 
Köthenbürger, M. “Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization”, International Tax and Public Finance, 
Vol. 9, pp 391-408, 2002 
 
Aaberge, R. et al (2003), “To what extent do fiscal regimes equalize opportunities for income 
acquisition among citizens?”,  Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp 539-565, 2003 
 
Boadway, R., Cuff, K., Marchand, M. (2003) “Equalization and Decentralisation of Revenue-Raising 
in a Federation”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 5(2), pp 201-228, 2003 
 
Calabrese, S.M. (2001) “Local Redistribution Financed by Income Tax”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 
29, No. 4, pp 259-303, July 2001 
 
Unesco, Boadway, R. (2001), The imperative of fiscal sharing transfers (Blackwell Publishers: 2001) 
 
Borck, R.,  Owings, S. (2003), “The political economy of intergovernmental grants”, Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, Vol. 33, Issue 2, pp 139-156, March 2003 
 
Council of Europe, Limitations of local taxation, financial equalisation and methods for calculating 
general grants, (Local and regional authorities in Europe, No 65) 
 
Chu, H-y (2003), “The Dual-Illusion of Grants-in-Aid on Central and Local Expenditures”, Public 
Choice, Vol. 114, Nos 3-4, pp 349-359, March 2003 
 
OECD (2002), “Non-tax revenue, capital revenue and grants”, OECD Revenue Statistics of OECD 
Member Countries, Vol. 2002, Release 1, October 2002 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), Local Government Grant Distribution: an International Comparative 
Study. 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., McNabb, R. (2003), “Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth”, World 
Development, Vol. 31, Issue 9, pp 1597-1616, September 2003 
 
Sokolow, A.D. (2000) “The Changing Property Tax in the West: State Centralization of Local 
Finances”, Public Budgeting & Finance, Spring 2000 pp 85-104 
 
Kunce, M. (2000),  “A Nash tax game extending the generality of the Henry George Theorem”, 
Economics Letters, Vol. 66, Issue 2, pp229-233, February 2000 
 
Lewis, B.D. (2003), “Tax and Charge Creation by Regional Governments under Fiscal 
Decentralisation: Estimates and Explanations”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 
39, No. 2, pp 177-192, August 2003 
 
de Mello, L.R. (2001), “Fiscal Decentralization and Borrowing Costs: The Case of Local 
Governments”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp 108-138, March 2001 
 
Sato, M. (2003), “Tax competition, rent-seeking and fiscal decentralization”, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp19-40, February 2003 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
76
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Jin, J.,  Zou, H-f (2001), “How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national and subnational 
government size?”, Journal of Urban Economics, September 2001, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp 270-293 
 
Flochel, L., Madies, T. “Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping 
Revenue Maximizing Governments”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp 
121-141, March 2002 
 
Koren, S., Stiassny, A. (1998) “Tax and Spend or Spend and Tax? An International Study”, Journal of 
Policy Modelling, April 1998, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp 163-191 
 
Hallerberg, M. (2002) “Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Policy” in Handbook of Public Administration, B. Guy 
Peters and John Pierre (eds) (London: Sage 2002) 
 
Loughlin, John, Delcamp, Alain (2003) (eds)  La Decentralisation dans les Etats de l’Union 
européenne, (Paris: La Documentation Française 2003) 
 
Local/Regional Government Finance  
 
Council of Europe (2000), “The financial resources of local authorities in relation to their 
responsibilities: a litmus test for subsidiarity”, 4th General Report on Political Monitoring of the 
Implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, Rapporteur, Mr Jean-
Claude Frécon, Strasbourg, 20 April 2000. 
 
Council of Europe, Effects on the financial autonomy of local and regional authorities resulting from 
the limits set at European level on national public debt, Local and regional authorities in Europe, 
No. 71  
 
Council of Europe, Local finance in Europe, Local and regional authorities in Europe, No. 61  
 
Council of Europe, The risks arising from local authorities’ financial obligations, Local and regional 
authorities in Europe, No. 76,  Report by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy 
  
Council of Europe, Budgetary procedures and budget management at local authority level, Report by 
the Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy in collaboration with J-F Husson 
 
Fischel, W.(2001), The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government 
Taxation, School Finance and Land-Use Policies (Harvard University Press, 2001) 
 
Caulfield, J. (2000), Local Government Finance in OECD Countries, Paper given 19th February 2000 
at International Seminar, University of New South Wales 
 
Oates, W. (ed) (2001), Property Taxation and Local Government Finance: Essays in honor of C. 
Lowell Harriss, 2001 
  
Goddard, A. “Organizational Culture and Budget Related Behavior: A Comparative Contingency Study 
of Three Local Government Organizations”, The International Journal of Accounting, 1997, 
Vol. 32, No. 1, pp 79-97 
 
Dollery, B.E., Wallis, J.L. (2001), The political economy of local government (Great Britain: Edward 
Elgar, 2001 
 
Musgrave, R. A. (1973), Public Finance in Theory and Practice. (New York: McGraw Hill). 
Stoker, G. and Meehan, E. (2003) Local finance: guiding principles in context.  Paper 6 prepared for 
Balance of Funding Review. 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
77
Balance of Funding Review Research Sub-Group – Meeting 18 November 2003 – Paper 12  
 
 
Tiebout, C.M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 64, p. 5. 
 
Local Democracy – General 
 
King, D., Stoker, G. (eds) (1996), Rethinking Local Democracy (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1996) 
 
Hambleton, R., Savitch, H.V., Stewart, M. (eds) (2002), Globalism and Local Democracy: Challenge 
and Change in Europe and North America (Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
 
Hendriks, Frank and Tops, Pieter “Between Democracy and Efficiency: Trends in Local Government 
Reform in the Netherlands and Germany”, Public Administration, Vol. 77, no. 1, 133-153 
 
Loughlin, John et al. (2001), Sub-national Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and 
Opportunities, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© School of European Studies and the Centre for Local & Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University 
78
